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My professional interest as an economist resides in the measurement, analysis
and refinement of policy. I am a pragmatist at heart – most concerned with how
best to achieve society’s goals with limited resources – but no policy exists in
a vacuum, and so I cherish the contributions of economic theory in helping us
to understand the complex ways that our policies fit into and shape existing
institutions.
My first essay, “The Role of Fiscal Impacts in the Public School Response to
Charter Competition,” embodies my philosophy that policy research be rigor-
ous and data driven while being shaped by economic thinking. Charter schools
are a topic of great interest in education policy, and the effects of charter schools
on their own students have been closely examined. By the nature of their lim-
ited capacity, however, the main role charter schools play in reforming educa-
tion must be to shape the behavior of the public school system. My work aims
to improve our understanding of the little-studied effects of charter competition
on the reallocation of traditional public schools’ resources.
To the extent that existing work considers competition between charter
schools and the traditional public school system, it implicitly assumes a uniform
competitive pressure: losing more students to charter schools elicits a greater
response from public schools. However, public schools are diverse institutions
bound by tradition and history rather than the optimizing behavior that dis-
ciplines private firms in competitive markets – and the state mechanisms that
fund and regulate education are generally not rationalized to promote compe-
tition. In my first essay, I demonstrate that public schools’ responses to charter
competition display heterogeneity along a second dimension; districts that are
more fiscally constrained by unavoidable costs are correspondingly muted in
the degree to which they reallocate resources, even in the face of large losses
of students. I make the case that in evaluating the effects of charter schools or
school choice policies more generally, we must consider the degree to which
public schools are willing and able to respond; a well-designed school educa-
tion reform policy must provide both the means and the incentive to reform.
In “An Evaluation of the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship’s Effect
on PhD production at Non-UNCF institutions”, joint with Sarah J. Prenovitz,
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and George H. Jakubson, I study the effects of a high-
profile fellowship program for under-represented minority students on the ed-
ucational attainment of its beneficiaries. Evaluating this program presents two
major challenges: first, we do not observe PhDs in progress. Second, the pro-
gram was not designed for evaluation, and never collected the kind of rich data
on individuals now used in many administrative settings. By obtaining data on
the completions of all PhDs over a period of several decades, we estimate dis-
tributions of time-to-degree and use those to build projections of the PhDs that
will eventually be completed from each undergraduate class. We also use the
staggered inclusion of participating institutions into the fellowship program to
obtain a counterfactual estimate of the program’s effect. In the end we find no
causal effect of the program on the educational attainment of its participants;
although the rates of PhD completion are high outside of a causal analysis, the
program may be targeted towards those students who are already most likely
to complete doctoral degrees.
My final chapter, “Selection and Chronic Disease Research: The Seatbelt–
Diabetes Link,” is a tongue-in-cheek cautionary tale about statistical technique
conceived while I was studying the epidemiological literature for a course
in health economics. While many epidemiologists are now adapting current
econometric techniques to the study of disease, I found too many studies in
high-profile journals ignoring the behavioral aspects of chronic disease – lead-
ing to the use of data or statistical techniques inadequate to control for the prob-
lems of self-selection that social scientists all too often face. Using a repeated
cross-section of data on health behaviors and mimicking multivariate models
found in the epidemiology literature, I demonstrate a spurious ’causal link’ be-
tween seatbelt non-use and several chronic diseases. I further show that varying
degrees of self-reported seatbelt non-use are able to generate a dose-response
gradient in the risk for those diseases, a type of relationship often taken as evi-
dence in support of a causal link. Finally I use variation in the dates of passage
of different states’ seatbelt laws to demonstrate that the connection between
seatbelt non-use and risk of a diabetes diagnosis became stronger after the pas-
sage of laws mandating seatbelt use. This presents an additional problem even
for experienced statisticians – unknown events may alter the patterns of self-
selection, interfering with the course of an existing studied treatment. Lest the
point be missed, I take ample care to document that seatbelt non-users are less
healthy than seatbelt users in every dimension, from the amount of fruit and
vegetables they eat to their likelihood of seeing a doctor for regular check-ups.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF FISCAL IMPACTS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL RESPONSE
TO CHARTER COMPETITION
Gary R. Cohen & Jason B. Cook
1.1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, charter schools have risen to prominence in educa-
tion policy. These public, non-traditional schools were conceptualized decades
earlier (Budde 1974) as one part of a broader approach to education reform with
its roots in the notions of choice and competition (Friedman 1955), and have
have since become an important means of school choice policy with 5.1% of stu-
dents nationwide enrolled in charter schools (DOE 2015). There is a large and
conflicted literature on the effects of charter schools on the students who choose
to attend them (see Epple, Romano and Zimmer (2015) for a comprehensive
review) – but unless charter schools are to entirely replace the public school sys-
tem, their primary effects on public education as a whole must be to change the
behavior of traditional public schools.
While the theoretical benefits of charter schools to public education operate
through notions of competition and market discipline, relatively little is under-
stood about the mechanics of that competition. Research has focused in large
part on student outcomes, and that literature’s findings have been mixed: for
example, Hoxby (2003) and Booker et. al (2008) find positive effects of charter
competition on the achievement of students in public schools, while Bettinger
(2005) and Bifulco and Ladd (2006) find no such effects.
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In their survey of research on charter schools, Epple, Romano and Zimmer
(2015) reconcile these conflicting findings with an important conceptual point:
when choosing how to measure charter competition, the extant literature “gen-
erally assumes we know how a competitive threat is perceived by relevant ac-
tors.” The degree to which traditional public school districts (TPSDs) actually
perceive threat from charter schools may depend on a number of factors, includ-
ing whether charter schools make up a significant portion of the “market share”
of students, whether those charters are of high enough quality to threaten the
TPSD on a performance basis (see for example Cremata and Raymond (2014)),
whether the TPSD faces significant pressure from the loss of financial resources
to charter competition (e.g. Bifulco and Reback 2014), or some combination of
the above.
These conceptual issues aside, the focus on student outcomes has also left
open many questions about the response of public schools to charter pressure at
the institutional level. The vast majority of available research on these questions
is qualitative and anecdotal: for example, Teske, Schneider, Buckley and Clark
(2000) document how specific TPSDs have opened special Montessori schools in
response to charter pressure, offered Saturday study programs, widened their
offerings of before- and after-school programs or made other discrete adjust-
ments to the services they offer. To date, the quantitative evidence on charter
schools’ effects on TPSD resource allocation comprises only two studies: Arsen
and Ni (2012) and Cook (2016).
Arsen and Ni (2012) examine traditional public schools in Michigan and find
no significant evidence of an effect of charter competition on TPSD resource allo-
cation. However, due to data limitations a large portion of their data on charter
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school market share must be imputed, and due to Michigan’s relatively uniform
rollout of its charter program there is little exogenous variation in charter com-
petition for the researchers to exploit – forcing them to rely only on fixed effects
to account for the endogenous location of charter entry.
Cook (2016) studies charter schools in Ohio, where richer data on student
transfers to charter schools is available and where the multi-stage expansion of
the state’s charter program leaves different districts vulnerable to charter entry
at different times. He finds that TPSDs respond to charter school competition by
reducing expenditures on instruction and other expenses (the former partially
due to decreases in collectively bargained salaries) in order to increase expendi-
ture on new capital construction.
With so little documented evidence on TPSDs’ institutional responses to
charter competition on average, it is no surprise that questions of heterogene-
ity also remain unanswered. Charter schools are intended to be “laboratories
of education,” and there is considerable variation in their grade spans, focuses,
characteristics, practices and resulting student outcomes (e.g. Angrist, Pathak
and Walters 2013, Ferreyra and Kosenok 2016). Beyond the variation in charter
schools themselves, Bifulco and Reback (2014) argue that the characteristics of
traditional public schools and the state’s charter school financing scheme help
to determine the financial pressures placed on public schools by charter compe-
tition.
This study makes two main contributions to the literature on charter com-
petition. First, we address the fitness of traditional measurement of charter
competition by supplementing our measure of the “market share” of students
attending charter schools with a measure of a TPSD’s financial incentive to re-
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tain students. Second, we addresses the question of heterogeneity in TPSDs’
resource re-allocations in response to charter competition, building on the find-
ings of Cook (2016) to discern to what extent TPSD characteristics influence their
response to competitive pressure from charter schools. To do this, we first de-
sign a measure of a school district’s willingness to pay to retain a student who
would otherwise transfer to a charter school, and we discuss how this measure
is influenced by the district’s revenues and costs. Then, using exogenous varia-
tion in charter school competition from the gradual expansion of Ohio’s charter
program, we examine how TPSDs reallocate resources to respond to that com-
petition – and how their responses vary between schools with different fiscal
incentives to retain students. We find that many districts have no financial in-
centive to retain students at all, and correspondingly find little evidence that
variation in the strength of that incentive drives TPSDs facing similar charter
“market shares” to respond differently to charter threat. We do find, however,
that districts that are more financially constrained by higher fixed costs are more
muted in their responses to competition – suggesting that TPSDs’ responses to
charter pressure may be driven by non-fiscal incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the impor-
tant institutional details of Ohio’s charter school program. Section 1.3 describes
our derivation of the ’willingness to pay’ measure, Section 1.4 presents the em-
pirical strategy and evaluates its validity, and Section 1.5 describes the data and
the construction of the measures we use to estimate our empirical model. Sec-
tion 1.6 presents the results, Section 1.7 discusses them, and Section 1.8 con-
cludes.
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1.2 Background
Charter schools in Ohio are public nonprofit schools operated under the loose
supervision of the state Department of Education1 but otherwise purposefully
independent of many of its regulations. Rather than follow the prescribed edu-
cation policies of the state, charter schools are instead governed by a “charter,”
a contract between the school and its authorizer that details the structure and
educational objectives of the school and its plans to achieve those objectives.
While charter schools may not be sectarian or operated by sectarian schools and
are bound by certain laws on safety and transparency that apply to all Ohio
schools, they are otherwise free of many of the “state laws and rules pertaining
to schools, school districts, and boards of education, except those laws and rules
that grant certain rights to parents.” (33 ORC §14). This is intended to provide
charter schools with greater flexibility than traditional public schools in terms
of budgets, staffing, and curriculum. In addition, while students are typically
restricted to attending their school district of residence, charter schools are open
to students across the state unless otherwise specified in their charters.
When discussing charter schools in Ohio specifically, it is important to dis-
tinguish between conversion and start-up schools. Conversion schools are for-
mer traditional public schools that have been converted either wholly or in part
to charter schools by vote of their hosting district’s board of education and are
sponsored by their hosting district rather than an outside entity – and thus there
is some question as to what kind of ’competition’ they might pose for their hosts
and sponsors.2 For policy purposes, conversion schools have been allowed to
1As of Ohio H.B. 364 (Eff. 04/08/03), the Ohio Department of Education oversees the spon-
sors of charter schools, who in turn oversee the schools themselves.
2While conversion charter schools are likely to have quite different effects on public school
districts than ‘typical’ charter schools, they are excluded from the local average treatment effect
5
open statewide since the advent of Ohio’s charter school program in 1997, and
an unlimited number of conversion schools may be established in any school
district. As of the 2014-15 school year, conversion schools represent 19% of Ohio
charter schools and 8% of Ohio charter school enrollment (ODE 2015).
Start-up schools are new school openings sponsored by individuals, com-
munities or private or public organizations,3 and must independently fund a
majority of their expenses including the large costs of acquiring facilities. In ad-
dition, start-up schools are subject to much stricter regulation governing where
and when they can open across the state. A full legislative history of the rules
governing the entry of start-up schools is provided in section 1.2.1.
A second important delineation among Ohio charter schools is that between
site-based schools and eSchools. While both types of schools are subject to
much of the same legislation4, they differ in their instructional methods. Site-
based charter schools provide typical classroom instruction, whereas instruc-
tion at eSchools occurs online and students attending these schools are entitled
to school-provided computers. As of the 2014-15 school year, eSchools repre-
sent only 6% of Ohio charter schools but 32% of Ohio charter school enroll-
ment (ODE 2015). While eSchools provide a convenient option for students who
would have difficulties commuting to a site-based charter school, they have his-
torically been the source of much controversy and new eSchools were prevented
created by our instrumental variables design. For details, see Section 1.4.2.
3Start-up charter schools may be sponsored by teachers, parents, communities, public school
districts, joint vocational school districts, educational service centers, public universities, the
Ohio Department of Education and “qualified nonprofits” – 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities who
have specifically been in operation for at least five years, have assets of at least five hundred
thousand dollars and have been determined by the Department of Education to be an education-
oriented entity under division (B)(3) of 33 ORC §14.015.
4eSchools are subject to certain additional standards governing their adherence to online
learning standards and their provision of computer equipment and in-person testing sites (33
ORC §14.2)
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from opening between 2005 and 2013.5
1.2.1 Legislative History of Charter Entry
Ohio’s charter school program commenced in June 1997 with the enactment of
HB 2156, which authorized a ’pilot’ charter school program in Lucas County
and allowed the Lucas County Educational Service Center and the University
of Toledo to sponsor start-up charter schools within the county. The bill also
allowed conversion charter schools to open statewide, sponsored by their host-
ing traditional public school districts. Just months later, SB 557 expanded the
putative pilot program to include the eight largest urban districts in Ohio and
added the State Board of Education as a sponsor of start-up charter schools.
The next major expansion of Ohio’s charter school program occurred in 1999
with HB 282 8, which allowed start-up charter schools to open without condition
in any of the 21 largest urban districts in the state. The bill also allowed start-
up charter schools to open in any district assigned the state’s lowest rating of
’Academic Emergency,’ regardless of geographic location.
Four years later, 2003 marked a shift in tone for the program with the enact-
ment of two separate bills. HB 3 9 tightened the purely geographic restrictions
on charter schools, once again limiting them to open in the eight largest urban
districts and Lucas County – although charter schools that opened in the next
13 largest districts under HB 282 were allowed to continue operation. On the
5Ohio H.B. 66 (Eff. 6/30/05) and H.B. 153 (Eff. 6/30/11)
6Eff. 6/30/1997
7Eff. 11/21/97
8Eff. 6/29/99
9Eff. 8/15/03
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other hand, under HB 364 10 the restriction on academic rating was loosened so
that start-up charter schools were also allowed to open in any district assigned
the state’s second lowest rating of ’Academic Watch.’11 HB 364 also changed
the role of the State Board of Education from sponsoring charter schools to au-
thorizing other sponsors, opening the door for start-up charter schools to be
sponsored by school and joint vocational districts, educational service centers,
public universities and qualified nonprofits.12
Figure 1.1 plots the number of charter schools operating in Ohio in each year
over the sample period, and shows the growth of the state’s charter system with
each legal expansion of the program. Between 1997 and 2011, more than 300
charter schools opened in Ohio. While the charter program was given some
momentum by the opening of large urban districts to charter entry, most of
the program’s growth appears to have occurred between 2001 and 2005 when
many more districts became eligible for charter entry on the basis of academic
performance.
Figure 1.2 plots the intensity of charter competition (measured by the per-
centage of district resident students transferring to charter schools in a given
year) from the inception of the charter program in 1997. While the number of
charter schools rose fastest in the years where academic performance opened a
large number of non-urban TPSDs to charter entry, the trend in the share of stu-
dents transferring to charters has remained more steady over the period. Figure
2 also makes plain the de facto focus of Ohio’s charter program: by the end of
10Eff. 04/08/03
11While restricted to opening in low-performing districts, these start-up schools are allowed
to continue operation once the school district is no longer in a state of Academic Emergency or
Academic Watch.
12These nonprofits were limited to sponsoring schools that were previously sponsored by the
state board of education and were not allowed to sponsor new schools until Jul 1, 2005.
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Figure 1.1: Charter Schools in Ohio
the sample period, more than 20% of students residing in the largest 8 urban
districts attend charter schools, as do 10% of the students residing in the next
largest 13 districts. Meanwhile, charter attendance in all other districts remains
below 3% on average.
1.2.2 Outline of Charter Impact on District Revenues
To understand the financial pressures on TPSDs created by Ohio’s charter school
program, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which TPSDs lose
revenue to charter schools. Charter school enrollments affect district revenues
9
Figure 1.2: Intensity of Charter Competition Over Time, by District Type
in Ohio in three ways.
First, a great deal of the federal funding to Ohio schools is formula based.
Awards from Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
– the largest federal aid program to public schools – are determined based in
large part on district enrollment. When a student transfers to a charter school,
that funding follows the student and represents a loss of federal revenue for
the district. Additionally, grants made through the Child Nutrition Act and
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to eligible students follow those
students to charter schools.
At the state level, formula aid is paid to TPSDs based on the number of
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students who are eligible to enroll, and then payments are deducted to char-
ter schools based on the number of students who transfer. While the base for-
mula amount is set per year and the payments to charter schools are largely
fixed,13 the formula aid received by TPSDs represents a portion of that base
amount which depends on the district’s relative wealth. It is therefore pos-
sible for districts to pay more to charter schools than they receive from the
state, in which case the payment is instead deducted from state reimburse-
ments to TPSDs made for lost revenue from property tax reductions through
Ohio’s Homestead Tax Exemption14 and Residential Property Tax Reduction.15
Through this mechanism TPSDs are able to lose ’quasi-local’ revenues to char-
ter schools; local property tax revenues are not directly vulnerable to charter
competition, but state reimbursement payments on a portion of foregone tax
revenues are.
Finally, aside from mechanical declines in formula funding there is evidence
that charter competition causes decreases in local tax revenues through a decline
in property values. Cook (2016) estimates that a percentage point increase in the
share of TPSD students transferring to charter schools decreases real appraised
property values by 2.5 percent.
1.3 Defining Fiscal Impacts
Public school districts are complex non-profit institutions, and it is not obvious
a priori how competition from charter schools might impact their incentives and
13Some additional deductions are made for special education students, limited English profi-
cient students and career-technical education students. (33 ORC §14.08)
143 ORC §23.156
153 ORC §21.24
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constraints. We would ideally like to capture the essence of the school district’s
problem while remaining somewhat agnostic to the details of its objective func-
tion. We therefore choose to define the fiscal impacts of charter competition
using a ‘willingness to pay’ or WTP measure, outlined as follows:
Suppose public school district i in year t has monotonically increasing pref-
erences over some idiosyncratic blend of per-student expenditures, conditional
on also meeting a fixed cost of operation cit. If the district’s revenue is given by
the sum of state and federal government revenue Git and local revenue Lit and
the size of its student body by Nit, the per-student resources available to spend
at the district’s discretion are (Lit +Git − cit)/Nit.
Now, suppose a charter school opens and attracts S it students away from
the district. This students each take with them a transfer payment Pit(Git),
which includes both the payment to the charter school based on state for-
mula aid and also the foregone federal aid outlined in section 1.2.2 (and there-
fore partially depends on the district’s state and government revenue Git but
not its local revenue Lit)16. The district is left with per-student resources
(Lit +Git − S it · Pit(Gut) − cit)/(Nit − S it). Comparing the numerator and denomina-
tor of this expression with those from the paragraph above, we can see clearly
the tension between having fewer resources and needing to spread them among
fewer students.
With that in mind, we can define a district’s willingness to pay to retain their
students. Suppose that instead of losing the students and paying the transfer
16Under current Ohio law, there is some dependence between local revenues and the charter
payment. Districts with low relative property wealth receive targeted assistance funding from
the state department of education (33 ORC §17.022), and 25% of the per-pupil amount of that
funding is paid to charter schools when a student transfers (33 ORC §14.08). However, this
payment is introduced effective 9/24/2012 with Ohio SB 316, and our sample period ends with
the 2011-12 school year.
12
payment S it · Pit(Git), the district could spend some amount Wit – constructing a
new building, enhancing a sports program or providing some other amenity – in
order to retain some of those students.17 Define the students lost by S it (Wit,Chit)
as a function of the district’s spending and the area’s overall level of charter
competition Chit. We assume spending lowers the number of students who
transfer and has diminishing returns, so:
S ′ (W,Ch) < 0
S ′′ (W,Ch) > 0
Now, the district is left with per-student discretionary resources:
Lit +Git − cit − S it (Wit,Chit) · Pit (Git)
Nit − S it (Wit,Chit)
The district attempts to maximize these per-student resources by its choice
of Wit, yielding the first order condition:
S ′it (W,Ch) · (Git + Lit − cit − Nit · Pit (Git))
(Nit − S it (Wit,Chit))2
= 0
Without deciding on a functional form for S it (Wit,Chit) we cannot find a
closed form solution for optimal spending. However, if we can show that the
first order condition is monotonically decreasing in Wit, we will know that the
optimal spending level W?it – the district’s willingness to pay to defray competi-
tion – rises with variables that increase the first order condition, and falls with
variables that decrease it. We can therefore sign comparative statics without a
17We could have modeled Wit as a per-student expenditure but considered it to be something
like a capital project that may not scale with school size. Our empirical results are very similar
when we model Wit as spending per student.
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direct solution. To show that the first order condition is monotonically decreas-
ing in Wit, we first take its derivative with respect to Wit, yielding:
(Git + Lit − cit − Nit · Pit (Git0))
(
(Nit − S it (Wit,Chit)) · S ′′it (Wit,Chit) + 2
(
S ′it (Wit,Chit)
)2)
(Nit − S it (Wit,Chit))3
(Nit − S it (Wit,Chit)) must be positive if the district is left with any stu-
dents after charter competition. S ′′it (W,Ch) is positive by assumption,
and 2
(
S ′it (Wit,Chit)
)2
is positive. The sign of the expression rests on
(Git + Lit − cit − Nit · Pit (Git)) . However, we can resolve this with some logic. The
district will only be willing to spend money to retain students when the amount
Pit (Git) lost if that students leaves is greater than the existing level of per-student
surplus. If not, some of that student’s surplus remains in the district while
the denominator shrinks, leaving the district strictly better off on a per-student
scale. Then if the district spends at all it must be the case that:
Pit (Git) >
Git + Lit − cit
Nit
Nit · Pit (Git) > Git + Lit − cit
Then for districts with positive willingness to pay, (Git + Lit − cit − Nit · Pit (Git))
is less than zero, and the first order condition is monotonically decreasing in Wit.
Recall that S ′it (Wit,Chit) < 0. We can immediately conclude that increasing
Lit lowers willingness to pay and cit raises willingness to pay. If a district has
more funds available which are not vulnerable to charter competition, it is less
willing to spend in order to prevent the loss of students. Similarly, if a district is
more financially constrained, its revenue is more valuable and it is more willing
to spend to retain students.
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Increasing Git lowers WTP if
Git > NitPit (Git)
Git
Nit
> Pit (Git)
and therefore if the existing government revenue per student is less than the
per-student payment made to the charter school. This is also fairly intuitive – if
the district is allowed to keep some of each student’s state and federal govern-
ment revenue when that student leaves, it is better in per-student surplus terms
to keep part of a student’s revenue without keeping the student unless doing so
prevents a district from meeting its fixed cost cit.
To the extent that this framework accurately describes the incentives faced
by public school districts, to the extent that those districts have both the where-
withal to spend W?it , and to the extent that such an expenditure exists,
18 we
should expect the public school response to charter competition to vary between
districts with different values of W?it . So long as the optimal expenditure W
?
it re-
quired to retain students differs from the district’s resource allocation prior to
charter entry, districts with higher willingness to pay should exhibit a greater
degree of resource reallocation than those with lower willingness to pay. Cor-
respondingly, we should see a greater degree of resource reallocation among
districts with higher fixed costs, with lower relative shares of local revenue, and
with smaller student bodies.
18Because charter schools are subject to less strict regulation than traditional public schools,
there are some dimensions in which TPSDs are not legally able to compete with charters. We
must assume that at least some students who would leave to charters can be convinced to stay
with amenities the district can legally provide.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Baseline Model
The estimation at its most basic would consider two groups of districts within
the same local economy in a given year. One group would experience charter
competition the following year, and one would not. Within each group, suppose
there is variation in the ability or incentive to reallocate to retain students, prox-
ied by one of the financial variables Fit we describe in Section 1.3. Our baseline
model then compares the change in outcomes over time between these districts.
Specifically, we estimate:
yict = α + β1Cit + β2F it + β3Cit · F it + γct + φi + ict
where yict is the outcome of interest for district i during school year t in commut-
ing zone c, γct are commuting zone–by–school year fixed effects, φi are school
district fixed effects and ict is an idiosyncratic error term.19 Cit represents our
measure of charter competition – the fraction of students that reside in district i
in year t but attend a charter school instead of their TPSD of residence. The fixed
effects in this model account both for time-invariant district characteristics, and
common shocks affecting commuting zones in a particular year. If – net of these
common shocks and district-invariant characteristics – no other determinants of
the outcome are correlated with charter competition or fixed costs, then equa-
tion (1) correctly identifies the effect of competition and its heterogeneity across
districts by fixed cost.
19Year 2000 Commuting Zones are groups of counties designated by the Department of Agri-
culture to delineate local economies.
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This is unlikely to be the case. The measure of charter competition and that
of fixed cost are both affected by student transfers, and students choose whether
to attend charters or their TPSD of residence. While the fixed effects φi prevent
bias due to differences in unobserved time-invariant district characteristics, cor-
relation between trends driving student transfer decisions and trends in district
outcomes would bias both measures. The fixed effects γct restrict these prob-
lematic correlations to districts located within the same commuting zone, but
within–commuting zone correlations of trends will still bias the identification.
Because many commuting zones align with metropolitan areas and include both
city districts and surrounding suburbs, there is ample reason to fear a violation
of this identification assumption.
1.4.2 Instrumental Variables Model
While a naive estimate of the effects of charter competition and district hetero-
geneity is prone to bias from unobserved trends, it is possible to obtain a more
convincing local estimate by restricting the source of variation in charter com-
petition to only that produced by Ohio’s charter policy around start-up schools.
As described in section 1.2.1, the state’s conception and expansion of its charter
school program proceeded in multiple stages, opening different school districts
to treatment at different times.
Following Cook (2016), we instrument for charter competition using the dif-
ferential effects of TPSDs being assigned the two lowest academic ratings before
and after the years in which state policy would make those schools vulnerable
to charter entry: 2000 for “Academic Emergency” under HB 282, and 2003 for
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“Academic Watch” under HB 364. Because ratings-based vulnerability is based
on the rating from the previous year, and because Ohio policies create a one-
year lag between a district being eligible for charter entry and charters actually
opening, we use as instruments the interaction between t− 2 lagged rating indi-
cator variables with an indicator for whether the relevant policy was in effect on
or after the t−2 year. We include the t−2 ratings themselves as controls, causing
us to identify the effect of charter competition off of the change in relationship
between lagged academic ratings and subsequent outcomes caused by HB 282
and 364. As a third instrument, we use an indicator for whether the district was
eligible for charter entry during the previous year under HB 215, SB 55, HB 282
or HB 3 regardless of academic status.
This instrumental variables framework produces a more plausible set of
identification assumptions: it requires that the timing of state policies be uncor-
related with intra–commuting zone trends described in section 1.4.1, and that
the only change in the relationship between lagged academic ratings and sub-
sequent outcomes within districts is the passage of the laws allowing charters to
open in those districts. To further address potential concerns about the impacts
of lagged academic ratings,20 we control for t − 1 academic ratings. In this set-
ting, any remaining source of bias through lagged academic ratings must come
from a regime change in the relationship between t − 2 lagged academic ratings
and subsequent outcomes unrelated to charter entry policies and not absorbed
by the effects of t − 1 lagged academic ratings.
While these instruments are sufficient for Cook (2016)’s estimates of the ef-
fects of charter competition overall, state policy unsurprisingly provides very
20For instance, schools that receive a low rating may face financial sanctions or may be moti-
vated to make spending changes.
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weak identification for changes in the financial variables that underpin our anal-
ysis. For that reason, we adapt Cook (2016)’s model to include the other terms
in equation (1) – including the financial variable of choice as an exogenous re-
gressor and instrumenting for both charter competition and its interaction with
that financial variable using the instruments described above and their own cor-
responding interactions. Specifically, we estimate:
yict = β1Cict + β2F ict + β3Cict · F ict + δ11(AW)i,t−1 + δ21(AE)i,t−1
+ φ11(AW)i,t−2 + φ21(AE)i,t−2 + γct + ηi + ict
using the corresponding first stages
Cict = κ111(AW)i,t−1 + κ
1
21(AE)i,t−1 + ξ
1
11(AW)i,t−2 + ξ
1
21(AE)i,t−2
+ θ111(AE)i,t−2 · 1(Post 1999)t−2 + θ121(AE)i,t−2 · 1(Post 1999)t−2 · F ict
+ θ131(AW)i,t−2 · 1(Post 2002)t−2 + θ141(AW)i,t−2 · 1(Post 2002)t−2 · F ict
+ θ151(Urban District Policy)i,t−1 + θ
1
61(Urban District Policy)i,t−1 · F ict
+ Γ1ct + ψ
1
i + ν
1
ict
Cict · F ict = κ211(AW)i,t−1 + κ221(AE)i,t−1 + ξ211(AW)i,t−2 + ξ221(AE)i,t−2
+ θ211(AE)i,t−2 · 1(Post 1999)t−2 + θ221(AE)i,t−2 · 1(Post 1999)t−2 · F ict
+ θ231(AW)i,t−2 · 1(Post 2002)t−2 + θ241(AW)i,t−2 · 1(Post 2002)t−2 · F ict
+ θ251(Urban District Policy)i,t−1 + θ
2
61(Urban District Policy)i,t−1 · F ict
+ Γ2ct + ψ
2
i + ν
2
ict
where 1(AW)i,t is an indicator equal to one if district i was in “Academic
Watch” in year t, and 1(AE) is an indicator equal to one if district i was in
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“Academic Emergency” in year t. 1(Post 1999)t and 1(Post 2002)t are indi-
cators equal to one if year t is on or after 1999 or 2002, respectively, and
1(Urban District Policy)t−1 is an indicator equal to 1 if the district qualified for
charter entry in the previous year based on its urban status under HB 215, SB
55, HB 282 or HB 3.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Data Sources
In order to construct measures of charter competition and fiscal impacts on
TPSDs and to estimate their corresponding effects on TPSD resource allocation,
we use data from two sources.
Data on student transfers from TPSDs to charter schools and the accompany-
ing payments for school years 2001-02 to 2011-12 are sourced from the Ohio De-
partment of Education (ODE) “District Foundation Settlement Reports,” avail-
able on its school finance website.
Data on district enrollments, revenues and expenditures for years 1986-87
to 2011-12 are sourced from the National Center for Education Statistics’ School
District Universe Survey and School District Finance Survey. However, financial
data from the earliest years were collected only sporadically. With both sources
taken together, our sample period comprises the 1991-92 school year and the
1994-95 through 2011-12 school years.21
21The ’baseline’ results in Table 1.2 without any financial variables also include the 1989-90
school year.
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1.5.2 Measuring Charter Competition
Following Arsen and Ni (2012) and Cook (2016), we measure charter competi-
tion as the share of full-time equivalent public school students who reside in a
school district but attend a charter school instead of their district of residence.
From 2001 onward, we are able to observe this number of transfers directly
through the aforementioned “District Foundation Settlement Reports” gener-
ated by the ODE. These reports delineate the number of students sent by each
TPSD to each charter school in the state as well as the corresponding payments
made by each TPSD to those charter schools.
From 1998 to 2001, data on the number of transfers is not available and we
must estimate a proxy. Again following Cook (2016), we estimate the num-
ber of charter transfers by dividing a district’s total payments to charter schools
(sourced from the NCES’ School District Finance Survey) by the annual base for-
mula payment to charter schools described in Section 1.2.2. Because we implic-
itly assume that none of these students fall into categories outlined in Section
1.2.2 that mandate additional payments to charter schools, this measure some-
what overstates the number of transfers for this period.22 For a small number of
remaining schools with missing charter payment information over this period,
we assume that all charter students attending charter schools were transfers
from the “serving” district in which those charter schools were permitted to
open rather than from other TPSDs of residence. This accurately captures the
number of transfers but overstates the amount of charter competition, hence our
22While it may be possible to obtain a better estimate by also estimating the share of special
education students among the transfers, the language of Ohio’s charter law for these first few
years of the program was extremely vague on additional payments for these students – suggest-
ing charters be paid the ’actual cost’ to educate them minus whatever federal special education
funding they receive.
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Figure 1.3: Student Transfers to Charter Schools, Actual and Estimated
preference for the payment method.
Figure 1.3 plots aggregated charter school enrollment counts from the Ohio
Department of Education from 1997–2014 against the sum of district-level char-
ter transfers observed post-2001 and estimated pre-2001 until the end of the
sample of dis-aggregated transfer counts in 2011. These measures closely track
each other through the sample period, supporting an assertion that the dis-
aggregated estimates and observations of transfers obtained by the methods
above represent a realistic picture of charter competition over this time frame.
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1.5.3 Measuring Fiscal Impacts
Our theoretical framework defines a school district’s willingness to pay to de-
fray the loss of students from charter competition in terms of its revenues, fixed
costs, size of the student body and the average transfer payment per student
lost. With a number of assumptions, we can derive a measure of willingness to
pay from the data.
The revenue Yit and size of the student body Nit can be obtained directly from
the NCES’ School District Finance Survey and Public Elementary/Secondary
School Universe Survey. Because it is impossible to define a ’typical’ loss of stu-
dents to charter competition, we define the measure with the number of trans-
fers S it = 1. This can be thought of as a per-transfer measure of the WTP.
The transfer payment Pit (Git) comes in two parts: the baseline payment to
charter schools and the movement of federal funding that follows eligible stu-
dents. The first part is relatively straightforward: we obtain the baseline pay-
ment from public schools to charter schools per student from the Ohio Depart-
ment of Education. The second requires assumptions on the proportion of trans-
fer students eligible for federal programs. In the absence of more detailed data
on transfers, we assume that students move to charter schools in the same pro-
portions that they attend their districts of residence – and so they carry with
them the district’s per-student average federal funding from the programs de-
scribed in Section 1.2.2.
The derivation of the fixed cost cit is more complicated, and necessarily open
to interpretation. There is no clear data-based delineation of what financial mea-
sures constitute a district’s fixed costs, and costs that are fixed on some horizons
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may not be on others. For example, expenditures on school principals are de-
fensible as fixed costs over a time horizon where schools may not be closed and
a number of school-level administrators are therefore required, but in the longer
run school closures have been demonstrated as one way public schools adapt to
charter threat (Bifulco and Reback 2014). Accepting that there is much room for
argument in what constitutes a school district’s fixed costs, we make three as-
sumptions about districts’ cost structures and carry them through the analyses.
Our first set of assumptions take as few expenditure categories as possible
to be fixed. Because public school districts in Ohio are required to provide
transportation for their resident students even if those students choose to at-
tend charter schools, we treat as fixed all spending on student transportation.
We also treat as fixed those payments that lie entirely outside a school district’s
control – payments to private schools, payments to state and local governments
and interest payments on debt. Finally, we treat as fixed non-salary, non-benefit
expenditure on plant operation and maintenance – e.g. heating and cooling
bills. Under these assumptions, 18.7 percent of district expenditures are fixed
on average.
Our second set of assumptions expands what we treat as a fixed expenditure,
and attempts to follow the spirit of Bifulco and Reback (2014)’s assumptions on
a different dataset. We expand on the first set of costs to include all spending (in-
cluding salary and benefits) on district boards of education, school principals,
business and central services (incl. printing and distribution, curriculum devel-
opment and research, etc.) and community services such as pools and libraries.
Presumably districts are able to make some cuts in these areas, but if student
losses to charter schools are not concentrated in particular parts of a district
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then districts may be unable to substantially change these school- or district-
level expenses. We believe these to be the most reasonable set of assumptions,
and they treat 43.3 percent of district expenditures as fixed on average.23
Finally, we make a last, more expansive set of assumptions about fixed costs
by including all employee benefits. This is likely to be a tenuous assumption –
while certain benefits are likely to be fixed costs, such as pension payments for
employees already in retirement, others (like fringe benefits for current workers)
may be easier to change. Without greater financial detail than the data provides,
we cannot distinguish the two – justifying the decision to make and test multiple
assumptions. Under these assumptions, 64.8 percent of district expenditures are
fixed on average.
A full listing of the spending categories available in the CCD finance survey,
and our assignment of them to fixed or variable costs under the above three
assumptions, is available in Appendix Table A.1. Of particular note are those
expenses we never treat as fixed. This includes the entire category of capital
outlay expenditures, which are by definition for new facilities and equipment
and not for maintenance. Within the category of support services, this group
includes enterprise operations (such as school-run bookstores) and nonspeci-
fied/other expenses. In non–elementary/secondary expenditures, this includes
expenditures on adult education or other programs. We also never treat as fixed
any salary expenditures for instruction (e.g. teachers), pupil support (e.g. guid-
ance counselors), instructional staff support (e.g. library and audiovisual) or
23Ohio traditional and charter public school districts may subscribe to the services of an edu-
cational service center (ESC), a separate type of local education agency which offers administra-
tive, academic, fiscal and operational support services. Districts with enrollment under 16,000
are required to be aligned to an ESC and can realign every two years. Because we do not have
a mapping from ESCs to districts, it is likely we are measuring district fixed costs with error
under this and the following broader definition.
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food services.
Under the conditions outlined above, we can construct a measure of will-
ingness to pay for every district in every year. Table 1.1 breaks down summary
statistics on districts’ WTP, fixed costs and proportion of local revenue by the
broad groups of districts relevant to Ohio’s charter laws. Column 1 displays the
statewide averages, while Columns 2 through 4 show summary statistics by the
various categories that made districts eligible for charter entry – being one of the
largest 8 urban districts, the next largest 13, or being any other district that fell
into a state of ’Academic Watch’ or ’Academic Emergency’ during the relevant
period outlined in Section 1.2.1.
While these categories of school district vary in size, in the levels of charter
competition they face, and in their local revenue shares, the average propor-
tion of costs we treat as fixed is remarkably consistent across all four categories.
Given our context of charter competition, however, the most striking difference
between these groups of districts is by their willingness to pay measures. Under
all three assumptions on fixed costs, the districts eligible for charter entry face
lower mean willingness to pay than the average Ohio district – especially so
for the largest 8 urban districts. This group faces the highest intensity of charter
competition by share of students transferring to charter schools, but the lowest in
terms of incentive to retain students under the assumptions laid out in Section
1.3.
Another key insight from Table 1.1 is that many of these groups have neg-
ative mean willingness to pay measures under the low and medium assump-
tions on fixed costs: a large share of the districts in those groups therefore have
no fiscal incentive to retain students. Beyond the summary statistics, then, it
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Full ’Big 8’ ’Urban 21’ ’Challenged’
Sample Districts Districts Districts
District Characteristics
Student Enrollment 2,915 34,195 8,785 2,477
(4,836) (20,263) (4,043) (1,448)
% Transferring to Charters 0.9 8.8 3.3 1.5
(2.2) (9.1) (4.4) (3.4)
Total Expenditures ($M) 26.4 370.9 84.8 21.9
(53.0) (233.5) (39.1) (15.2)
Payments to Charter Schools ($M) 0.4 19.4 1.8 0.3
(3.6) (24.9) (2.5) (0.8)
Calculated Variables
% Local Revenue 49.2 37.6 42.8 36.3
(16.4) (10.7) (16.4) (15.7)
% Fixed Costs (Low) 18.7 17.3 16.2 18.8
(5.1) (3.8) (3.8) (5.6)
% Fixed Costs (Medium) 43.3 43.2 42.5 43.5
(7.7) (5.4) (6.7) (9.0)
% Fixed Costs (High) 64.8 68.6 67.4 65.6
(10.2) (6.63) (9.0) (11.4)
$ Willingness to Pay (Low) -2,047 -4,632 -3,513 -2,715
(3,258) (3,451) (2,660) (6,907)
$ Willingness to Pay (Medium) 32 -1,780 -836 -395
(2,461) (2,771) (1,926) (4,564)
$ Willingness to Pay (High) 1,888 1,135 1,717 1,685
(2,029) (1,984) (1,475) (3,282)
N 11,589 152 247 1,176
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented. ’Big 8’ Districts
are the municipal school districts of the 8 largest districts in Ohio. ’Urban 21’ Districts
represent the next 13 largest cities. ’Challenged’ Districts are other districts who
ever received a rating of ’Academic Emergency’ or ’Academic Watch’ after Ohio law
made that a condition for charter entry.
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Figure 1.4: WTP Distribution - Low
is instructive to examine the empirical distributions of each willingness to pay
measure across district-years. Figures 1.4 through 1.6 display kernel density
estimates of the WTP measures.
The distributions of WTP appear to be mono-modal, with thick left tails rep-
resenting well-off districts with little financial incentive to retain students – it
is for this reason that although 68.2% of district-years display positive willing-
ness to pay under the medium fixed cost assumption, Table 1.1 shows that the
mean willingness to pay is only $32. A mere 15.5% of district-years have posi-
tive willingness to pay under the low fixed cost assumption, while a full 92.5%
of district-years have positive willingness to pay under the high fixed cost as-
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Figure 1.5: WTP Distribution - Medium
sumption. These distributions demonstrate the importance of the assumptions
we make: the less we assume districts can adjust their costs in response to char-
ter competition, the greater the impact of that competition and the more districts
would be willing to spend to retain students.
Decomposing Willingness to Pay in the Data
In Section 1.3, we demonstrate that our WTP measure is influenced by a dis-
trict’s local revenues and its fixed costs, and in Section 1.4 we discuss how we
might estimate the effects of charter competition mediated by these financial
measures. By including more than one financial variable in our estimating equa-
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Figure 1.6: WTP Distribution - High
tion, and more than one interaction term, it is also possible to examine the influ-
ence of WTP while holding constant a district’s availability of non-vulnerable
local funds or the tightness of its fixed cost constraint. In order to include WTP
alongside either of these financial measures, it is important for neither measure
to be too highly correlated with WTP as a whole, and for there to be simultane-
ous variation between districts in fixed costs and in local revenue.
The former condition holds in our dataset: the correlation coefficient be-
tween a district’s share of local revenues and its WTP varies from -0.04 to 0.06
depending on the assumption on fixed costs, and the correlation coefficient be-
tween a district’s share of fixed costs and its WTP varies from 0.11 to 0.45. To
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Figure 1.7: Lo.c Rev. vs (Low) Fixed Costs
address the latter condition, figures 1.7 through 1.9 plot Ohio’s school districts
by percent of local revenues versus percent of fixed costs under each assump-
tion, with vertical and horizontal lines through the mean of each variable. While
there does appear to be some relationship between these measures, districts are
well dispersed through the quadrants of fixed costs and local revenue.
While a district’s position among these quadrants is not fully deterministic
of its willingness to pay, it is instructive to look at a couple examples that are
towards the extreme of either distribution. Among districts above the 75th per-
centile for every measure of fixed costs and below the 25th percentile for local
revenue share, we mostly find small rural districts. Noble Local School District
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Figure 1.8: Loc. Rev. vs (Medium) Fixed Costs
– a rural district about an hour east of Zanesville, OH – is just one such district,
registering average fixed costs over the sample period of 22.7% (low), 49.8%
(medium) and 74.0% (high) and obtaining only 36.4% of its revenue from local
sources. A district like this would be quite fiscally vulnerable to charter com-
petition, and that shows in its average WTP: -$542 (low), $1,393 (medium) and
$3,108 (high). Even at the extremes of local revenue and fixed costs, this district
has no fiscal incentive to retain students if we assume very few costs are fixed –
but in every case its WTP is far above the statewide average.
On the other hand, districts below the 25th percentile for every measure of
fixed costs and above the 75th percentile for local revenue share tend to be small,
32
Figure 1.9: Loc. Rev. vs (High) Fixed Costs
wealthy cities or large suburbs. One such district is Bexley City School District
in East Columbus, OH. A full 73.7% of its revenues come from local sources,
and we measure only 15.2% (low), 38.3% (medium), or 61.1% (high) of its costs
as fixed. For this district, our WTP measure is understandably very low: -$5,788
(low), -$3,014 (medium) or -$210 (high). For a district like this, we would expect
to see little to no change in behavior if it were exposed to charter competition.
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1.5.4 Measuring Outcomes
To measure school districts’ behavioral responses to charter competition, we use
as our outcomes the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation24 of districts’
total expenditures across several broad categories provided by the NCES:
• Instruction
• Support
• Non–Elementary/Secondary
• Capital Outlay
Each of the first three categories includes expenditures on salaries and bene-
fits, programs and supplies, while the fourth includes construction or reno-
vation of structures and purchase and improvement of equipment. Expendi-
tures on instruction relate to any activities dealing with the interaction of teach-
ers and students in the classroom, home or hospital as well as co-curricular
activities. Those in support include expenditures on guidance, social work,
record maintenance, supervision of instructors, curriculum development, trans-
portation, expenditures for the board of education and office of the principal
and operation and maintenance for buildings, grounds and equipment. Non–
Elementary/Secondary expenses include adult education and community ser-
vices such as operations of public pools, libraries and child care services. Cap-
ital outlay covers the construction or purchase of fixed assets (including land,
buildings and grounds) and equipment.25 (NCES 2015).
24Coefficients on IHS-transformed variables can be interpreted like coefficients on log-
transformed variables, but the IHS transformation is able to handle the many cases in the public
school finance data where spending in these categories is zero for particular district-years. For
more information, consult Burbridge, Magee and Robb (1988).
25Note that maintenance of existing capital assets falls under Support expenditures.
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1.6 Results
Before examining the importance of heterogeneity along financial impacts in
public school responses to charter competition, it is useful to examine the av-
erage response. Table 1.2 presents results from a version of the model without
measures of financial impact. It is important to note that reproducing Cook
(2016)’s empirical model by leaving out financial impacts reproduces the theme
of his results. We find that charter competition causes threatened districts
to reallocate spending away from instruction and support and towards non–
elementary/secondary spending and capital outlay. Specifically, using the IV
estimates, a one percentage point increase in the share of students transferring
to charter schools (45% of a standard deviation) causes a 2.2 percent decrease in
expenditures on instruction, a 1.7 percent decrease in expenditures allocated to
support, and respective increases – though not statistically significant ones – of
8.6 percent and 3.3 percent on non–elementary/secondary spending and capital
outlay.
Next, we turn to Tables 1.3 through 1.5 to examine potential heterogeneity in
charter impacts using our calculated WTP measure, with each table presenting
estimates under one of the three assumptions on fixed costs discussed in Sec-
tion 1.5.3. However, there is not much to see: only for the ’high’ assumption
on fixed costs is there statistically significant evidence of heterogeneity. Com-
paring coefficients for the IV estimate on Charter×WTP in Table 1.5 with that
for charter competition alone predicts about a 5.1% more severe reduction in
instructional spending due to charter competition per $1000 increase in WTP,
or a 10.3% more severe reduction for a 1 standard deviation increase in WTP.
However, we detect no corresponding increase in non–elementary/secondary
35
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or capital outlay spending to compensate for the sharper decline in instructional
funds. The most we can detect are main effects of WTP on spending that vary in
size, especially for the high fixed cost assumptions in table 1.5 – where, using IV
estimates, a $1000 increase in WTP predicts only a 0.7% increase in spending on
support, a 3.7% increase in spending on non–elementary/secondary functions,
and a 27.5% decrease in capital expenditures. To the extent that WTP matters at
all, it mostly seems to effect change in the opposite direction of what our hy-
pothesis would predict: districts that are willing to spend more to defray the
loss of students to charter competition cut instructional spending more sharply
in response to that competition, but appear to also spend less on capital outlay
rather than making any compensatory increase. It may be that the overall finan-
cial pressure on high-WTP districts prevents such a reallocation – or that WTP
as defined does not adequately capture the district’s problem.
In Section 1.3, we discussed how the base components of WTP – districts’
local funding and their fixed costs – affect the district’s problem. In order to
address concerns raised by the above set of results, we can instead look for ev-
idence of heterogeneity directly by those financial variables. Tables 1.6 through
1.8 present results for similar models where, rather than mediate financial im-
pacts by willingness to pay, we do so using a district’s share of fixed costs di-
rectly. Turning first to Table 1.6, we observe some striking results; when ac-
counting for a district’s share of fixed costs, the main effect of charter compe-
tition on instruction and support appears to be small and statistically insignif-
icant, with decreases in those spending categories instead concentrated among
high–fixed-cost districts. The results are most dramatic, however, for districts’
capital expenditures: using the IV results in Table 1.6, we estimate the baseline
effect of a one standard deviation increase in charter competition to be a 56.5%
37
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increase in capital outlay, mitigated sharply by fixed costs. For a district with
average ’low’ fixed costs of 18.7%, we would only predict a 12.8% increase in
capital outlay from that size increase in charter competition. Results are sim-
ilar for Table 1.7, which uses the ’medium’ definition of fixed costs: a 2.2 ppt
increase in charter competition would be expected to increase capital outlay by
35.9%, but for a district with average fixed costs the predicted increase would be
a mere 14.28%. To reproduce the unconditional result from Table 2, we would
need a district with 57.4% of its costs fixed under the ’medium’ definition: i.e.
one with fixed costs 1.83 standard deviations higher than the average. Table
1.8 presents thematically similar results to Tables 1.6 and 1.7, using the ’high’
definition of fixed costs – though the coefficient estimates are smaller. The in-
tuition is relatively simple: districts have much higher mean fixed costs under
the ’high’ definition, so a similar magnitude coefficient on the interaction term
would predict a harsher decrease in spending than for the ’low’ and ’medium’
models.
Table 1.9 presents results for an alternative style of fiscal impacts – those me-
diated through a district’s share of local revenues. In Section 1.3, we discussed
how high local revenues lower a district’s WTP by decreasing the share of fund-
ing that is vulnerable to charter competition. The statistical evidence here is
relatively weak, but seems to support this hypothesis. Districts with higher lo-
cal revenues appear to spend slightly more on instruction and support, and in
the OLS models local revenues appear to blunt both the decrease in instructional
expenditures caused by charter competition and the increase in capital expen-
diture. This is consistent with the idea that high local revenue districts have less
incentive to respond, but the evidence should be taken with caution – the IV
models show disagreement in both significance and sign.
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1.6.1 Multiple Financial Impact Models
In Section 1.3 we demonstrated the importance of fixed costs and local revenues
as components of WTP, and in Section 1.5.3 we showed that districts appear
to be well distributed across the quadrants of fixed costs and local revenues.
This provides an opportunity for another way to model fiscal impacts: allow-
ing charter competition and its simultaneous interactions with WTP and one of
those two components. The addition of a second fiscal variable requires min-
imal adaptation of the model described in Section 1.4.2 – when instrumenting
for charter competition and the interactions, we now project all three variables
onto the full set of instruments and their interactions with each financial vari-
able.26 Our aim in doing so is to discern the effect of willingness to pay net of
each component – for example, controlling for fixed costs leaves the remaining
variation in WTP due to district size and local revenues, hopefully eliminating
the correlation of high WTP with tight fiscal constraints and potential inability
to make spending changes. Similarly, estimating the effects of WTP while con-
trolling for local revenues may remove some of the incentive effect of having
non-vulnerable funding from districts with low WTP.
Tables 1.10 through 1.12 look for evidence of heterogeneity in charter com-
petition by WTP after also including fixed costs. The parameters vary according
to which definition of fixed costs we use, but the theme remains the same: while
we find similar evidence to the single fiscal variable model in that higher-WTP
districts spend very slightly less on support and capital outlay and more on
non–elementary/secondary expenses, there is sparse if any evidence that WTP
plays a significant role in mediating the response to charter competition – both
26The exact first stage models used can be found in Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5.
46
in the significance and the magnitude of coefficients. Notably, the magnitudes
of the fixed cost coefficients are similar to those in Tables 1.6 through 1.8, sug-
gesting that our inclusion of both measures simultaneously does not provide
much additional information.
Table 1.13 presents a similar model that accounts both for WTP and for local
revenues under the ’medium’ assumption on fixed costs.27 Here, with the OLS
model on instruction we find some evidence that charter competition depresses
instructional spending, mitigated among districts with high local revenues and
enhanced by districts with high WTP. The sign and magnitude of WTP is simi-
lar to the model without local revenue, suggesting that partialing out this other
financial impact does not appear to affect our estimate of how WTP mediates
charter competition. In this model, a district facing a one percentage point in-
crease in charter competition is expected to lower its spending on instruction by
3.7%, but the decline is roughly halved for a district at the mean local revenue
share of 49.2% and increased by 6.4% for a district with WTP one standard de-
viation above the mean ($2,493). We should note that the mean WTP under the
medium fixed cost assumption is only $32, so the effect of WTP at the mean is
virtually zero.
1.6.2 Lagged Financial Impact Models
Because much of the public school spending response to charter competition ap-
pears concentrated in capital outlay, it may be useful to examine effects of char-
ter competition on financial variables several periods ahead. Capital projects
27Results are similar under the ’low’ and ’high’ assumptions and are available from the author
upon request.
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may take time to plan, and districts may need time to propose and pass tax
levies to fund such expenditures. Table 1.14 examines the role of fiscal impacts
in the public school response to two-year–lagged charter competition28. While
many of the coefficients are small or not statistically significant, there is some
evidence that these fiscal variables may play a role in expenditures on capital
outlay in response to competitive pressure from charter schools. The IV model
in Table 1.14 predicts a one percentage point increase in charter competition to
effect a 32.5% increase in spending on capital outlay, diminished to only a 9.6%
increase for districts at the mean fixed cost. While once again we would expect
virtually zero change in this effect for districts at the mean of WTP, a district
with average fixed costs but one standard deviation above mean WTP would
be expected to spend 3.2% more, for a total increase of 12.8%.
Table 1.15 examines the role of WTP and local revenues in the two year
lagged model. While the OLS results for instructional expenditures are consis-
tent with those in earlier models – predicting about a 3.5% decrease in instruc-
tional expenditures for school districts facing a one percentage point increase in
charter competition, with that decrease halved for districts at mean local rev-
enue share – those for capital outlay are somewhat more interesting. Rather
than an increase in capital outlay, the model finds that the main effect of charter
competition predicts a decrease of 24.2% in response to a one percentage point
increase in charter competition – but for districts at mean local revenue share,
the net effect is a 17.8% increase. We would predict only a 1.6% decrease in that
value for a district with one standard deviation above mean WTP, and the coef-
ficient is insignificant – so this model joins many of the others in casting doubt
on the role of WTP in district spending decisions.
28We tested several lagged values and find that effects tend to disappear after four years.
Results for one- to four-year lags are available on request.
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1.6.3 Robustness: Pre-Period Fixed Financial Models
Of course, it is quite possible that these financial measures are endogenous to
other aspects of the charter program, or outside events during the sample pe-
riod – for example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and its multitudinous
effects on school finances. For that reason, we choose to consider an additional
variation of the model, where we use only the pre-1997 averages of each finan-
cial variable. Our IV models in this specification instrument for charter compe-
tition in the same way as before. However, because there is no within-district
variation in the financial averages, the main effects of the financial variables
of interest are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. For this reason, these
models include only the interaction terms between the financial variables and
charter market share.
An analog to Table 1.11 using only pre-period averages of financial variables
is presented in Table 1.16. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is little in the way of
clean results for the 2SLS (IV) models outside of those predicting instruction and
support expenditures: the absence of variation in pre-period averages leaves
the first stage equations quite weakly identified. The models of instruction and
support spending agree with the time-varying models in the earlier sections,
but with much larger effect-sizes: each predict districts respond to charter com-
petition with large decreases in these categories, mediated significantly by their
proportion of fixed costs. For example, the IV model for instruction would pre-
dict a one percentage point increase in charter competition to correspond to a
9.2% decrease in instruction expenditures. For a district at the mean fixed cost,
we would predict only a 2.9% decrease. This magnitude is consistent with the
baseline model, but suggests high fixed cost districts reallocate to a lesser de-
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gree: a district with fixed costs one standard deviation above average would
decrease instruction expenditures by only 1.7% for every percentage point in-
crease in charter competition. The models for capital outlay provide no statis-
tically significant evidence on either the main effect of charter competition or
the interaction terms, with quite large standard errors compared to our previ-
ous modeling efforts. This may be due to poor identification from removing
the time variation in our key variables, but at least suggests some caution in
interpreting the results of the earlier models.
Table 1.17 provides estimates for the pre-intervention averages in analog to
Table 1.13, and produces similarly themed results. The models predict decreases
in instruction and support expenditures in response to charter competition, mit-
igated in those districts with high proportions of local revenue. Using the IV
model, a district facing a one percentage point increase in charter competition is
predicted to reduce expenditure on instruction by 4.3%, but for a district at the
mean of local revenue share we would instead predict a 3.3% decrease.
Like the other multiple financial impact models, these two models predict
no heterogeneity in the response to charter competition by WTP; higher-WTP
districts are expected to behave no differently than their peers.
1.6.4 Robustness: Effect of Last-Period Capital Expenditure on
Fixed Costs
While our estimations so far have assumed a model where school districts with
high fixed costs find themselves too constrained to undergo capital expendi-
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Table 1.18: Relationship Between Fixed Costs and Capital Outlay
Fixed Cost: Low Medium High
Fixed Costt−1 0.354*** 0.303*** 0.251***
(0.031) (0.017) (0.015)
Capital outlay
at time t -0.018*** -0.044*** -0.068***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.001)
t − 1 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.001)
t − 2 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009)
t − 3 0.001** 0.001* 0.002*
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008)
t − 4 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0010
(0.004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
t − 5 0.001*** 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Notes: N=7,923 district-year observations in 611 district clusters. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Capital outlay values and lags are inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformations of their levels. Additional
regressors are school district and commuting zone–year fixed effects.
ture in response to charter competition, a second possibility is likely: districts
that have made past capital expenditures face higher fixed costs in the present.
Therefore, low fixed costs act as a proxy for time elapsed since last capital project
– and districts where charters enter are choosing to make large capital invest-
ments when they have not already made investments in the past several years.
Table 1.18 presents results from an autoregressive distributed lag model for each
definition of fixed costs, regressing fixed costs on their own one-period lag, as
well as contemporaneous capital expenditure and a distributed lag of up to five
years. Once again, district and commuting zone-by-year fixed effects are in-
cluded so we consider only within-district variation net of commuting zone–
level shocks.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, capital expenditures up to three years prior are
highly significant determinants of present-year fixed costs. Taken together with
the mixed results from the pre-period fixed financial models outlined above,
these auxiliary results should cast doubt on the influence of fixed costs on cap-
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ital expenditures in the face of charter competition. It may indeed be the case
that charter competition prompts capital expenditure from public school dis-
tricts when those districts have not already undertaken a recent capital project.
1.7 Discussion
Taking seriously the conceptual critique of Epple, Romano and Zimmer (2015),
we construct a measure of a district’s willingness to pay to retain students and
use it as an explanatory variable alongside charter “market share” to form our
estimate of competitive pressure. However, we find little evidence that variation
in the strength of this incentive predicts TPSDs’ behavior in response to charter
threat.
The seeming unimportance of fiscal incentives in districts’ spending deci-
sions is interesting in itself. The model we posit to measure those incentives
is quite a general one, assuming no specific spending objective for the school
district but suggesting that district administrators care about their per-student
resources. This aligns our theoretical framework with formal models of school
choice and school competition (see for example Ferreyra (2007) and Nechyba
(2003)), all of which prominently feature spending per student in the production
function for school quality and correspondingly feature school quality as a key
amenity to the households choosing schools. While these models avoid giving
agency to TPSDs and instead treat them as functions of their local characteris-
tics and tax rates, it seems natural that per-student resources would comprise
an important part of the TPSD’s objective function.
However, it is quite possible that the district administrator’s objective is
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more nuanced. In a study of charter competition in California, Zimmer and
Buddin (2009) supplement their statistical analysis with a survey of TPS princi-
pals and find that even in the six districts with “prominent charter enrollments,”
84.9% of surveyed principals responded that charter competition had not af-
fected their district’s financial security and 87.9% reported that charter competi-
tion had not affected their district’s ability to attract and retain students. Despite
the stated lack of pressure, 40% of the surveyed principals reported making at
least one change in operational practice29 in response to charter schools.
Similarly, none of the handful of public school districts studied by Teske,
Schneider, Buckley and Clark (2000) faced levels of charter competition suf-
ficient to impose financial pressure. In the absence of those pressures, they
find that district-level attitudes towards charter schools are predictive of public
schools’ responses – administrators who view charter schools more favorably
undertake more reforms in their school districts.
Even if fiscal impacts figure prominently in the TPSD administrator’s objec-
tive, it is possible that these incentives are simply too weak in our sample to
hold much sway. It takes somewhat heroic assumptions on districts’ fixed costs
to produce a willingness to pay measure that is positive on average. Under our
other two sets of assumptions, it is not only the case that the average incentive is
negative or near-zero – it is also true that the average incentive is lower for those
districts eligible under Ohio law to have charters open within their boundaries.
Finally, it is altogether possible that methodological problems prevent our
finding a consistent effect of fiscal incentives on district behavior. While we are
29The surveyed practices comprise the structure of teacher compensation, hir-
ing/firing/discipline policy for teachers, curriculum, instructional practices and professional
development.
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able to obtain a plausibly exogenous source of charter entry, we have no such
source of variation in fiscal impacts. Our lagged estimates and our estimates of
the pre-intervention averages address this potential issue as best as can be done
with the existing data, but neither is an ideal solution.
While we obtain little evidence of the importance of fiscal incentives as we
have constructed them, we find consistently across our specifications that fixed
costs matter. The average response to charter competition observed both in this
study and previously by Cook (2016) is an increase in capital outlay, represent-
ing the construction or purchase of fixed assets or equipment. This could range
from new classroom buildings or sports facilities to the purchase of high-tech
classroom equipment or laptops for students. Under multiple definitions of
fixed costs, districts more constrained by those fixed costs increase capital out-
lay by smaller proportions than their less-constrained peers in response to char-
ter threat. This may indicate non-fiscal incentives for district administrators to
respond to charter threat, consistent with the findings of Zimmer and Buddin
(2009) and Teske, Schneider, Buckley and Clark (2000) – districts may be making
these resource reallocations if they are able rather than if they are willing.
The distinction between incentives is an important one – if school districts
are strongly motivated by fiscal incentives, a policymaker might wish to en-
courage reform by imposing harsher financial penalties for losing students to
charter schools. If fiscal incentives are not important, harsher penalties may
simply leave district administrators with less resources to use on reforms they
would have undertaken regardless.
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1.8 Conclusion
Charter schools have risen to prominence as the face of school reform policy,
bringing with them the promise of competitive discipline for traditional public
schools. However, we still understand very little about the mechanisms through
which competition in the ‘market’ for elementary and secondary public educa-
tion might operate. The available evidence focuses for the most part on stu-
dent achievement, leaving only a handful of studies to address the mechanisms
through which charter competition may evoke changes in public school dis-
tricts’ behaviors.
This study builds on the analyses of Arsen and Ni (2012) and Cook (2016)
to discern in some measure why those studies find the results that they do. We
find that a straightforward estimate of the effect of charter competition on public
school districts’ resource allocation masks significant heterogeneity, and that
district finances comprise an important and heretofore unexamined dimension
of the public school response.
While we find a small amount of evidence that districts with higher fiscal in-
centives to retain students spend more on capital outlay in response to charter
competition, the evidence on the importance of this incentive overall is inconsis-
tent and weak. This may not be surprising – in the majority of cases, school dis-
tricts’ financial incentives are actually to shed students rather than retain them.
The influence of districts’ fixed costs on their financial decision-making is far
more consistent across the models – in multiple specifications, under several as-
sumptions on fixed costs, higher fixed cost districts are muted in their response
to pressure from charter schools compared to their lower fixed cost peers.
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This suggests that an important and so far neglected component of thinking
on the public school response to charter schools concerns the degree to which
those public schools are financially able to make changes. If it is truly a goal of
charter schools to reform the public school system, policymakers must ensure
that public schools have not only the incentives but the means to respond.
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CHAPTER 2
AN EVALUATION OF THE MELLON MAYS UNDERGRADUATE
FELLOWSHIP’S EFFECT ON PHD PRODUCTION AT NON-UNCF
INSTITUTIONS
Gary R. Cohen, Sarah J. Prenovitz, Ronald G. Ehrenberg & George H. Jakubson1
2.1 Introduction
Colleges and universities seek to diversify their faculty along several dimen-
sions, but find few underrepresented minorities2 in their hiring pool, with the
problem worse in some fields than others. This is a manifestation of what is of-
ten referred to as the pipeline problem. Relatively few minorities pursue grad-
uate study in many disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, physical sci-
ences, or life sciences. If individuals do not enter PhD programs in a given
field they will not emerge from the other end of the pipeline as potential faculty
members.
The Mellon Minority Undergraduate Fellowship Program, since renamed
the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program (MMUF), was established
in 1988 with the goal of addressing this issue by encouraging underrepresented
minorities to pursue graduate study in particular fields, with an eye toward
1Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI). CHERI receives financial support
from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation but the conclusions we express here are strictly our
own. The use of NSF data does not imply NSF endorsement of the research, research methods,
or conclusions contained in this paper. A published version of this article exists as Prenovitz,
S.J., G.R. Cohen, R.G. Ehrenberg and G.H. Jakubson (2016). An evaluation of the Mellon Mays
Undergraduate Fellowship’s effect on PhD production at non-UNCF institutions. Economics of
Education Review 53: 284–295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2016.04.005. This mate-
rial is c©2016 by Elsevier and reproduced here with Elsevier’s permission.
2Underrepresented minorities are defined as those who identify neither as non-Hispanic
White nor as Asian.
67
ultimately entering academia. Participating schools select fellows from among
their students, coordinate mentoring, and hold regular seminars which empha-
size research and graduate school. Fellows receive stipends to allow them to
conduct research as undergraduates. They are eligible to attend regional and
national conferences at which they can present their own research, learn about
that done by other fellows, and network. Fellows can also receive up to $10,000
in loan repayments. As of 2014, over 4,000 students have participated in the pro-
gram; 506 have earned PhDs and another 665 PhDs are in progress (Bengochea,
2013). As the program has expanded over time and as most PhD programs
take at least 5 years to complete, if not substantially longer, this suggests an ex-
tremely high rate of PhD completion by MMUF scholars. A back of the envelope
estimate suggests that about a quarter of MMUF students will eventually com-
plete a PhD, compared with around 4% of underrepresented minority students
graduating from MMUF institutions in years their school was not participating
in the program.3
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the MMUF may play a large role in the ul-
timate PhD completion of its participants. MMUF administrators report strug-
gling to recruit undergraduate candidates because few students have consid-
ered the possibility of entering academia, and fellows cite their research experi-
ences, relationships with mentors, and connections with other fellows as crucial
to their decision to pursue a PhD and their ultimate success in completing one
3If we assume that the program selected the same number of fellows in each year for a total
of 4,000 as of 2014 and their distribution of completion times was the same as non-white non-
Asian students who completed a bachelors’ degree in a MMUF field in 1985–1989 and went
on to complete a PhD, we would expect to observe about half of those PhDs which will be
completed within 20 years of graduation. As approximately one in eight MMUF fellows has
completed a PhD, this suggests that about a quarter of MMUF fellows will do so eventually.
The program has grown over time, which would make this back of the envelope calculation
an underestimate. However, fellows also have incentives and supports to complete degrees
more quickly, so degrees completed so far may represent a larger proportion of those that will
eventually be completed.
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(Rose, 2012). However, fellows presumably apply to the program because of
their own interest and are selected based on their potential as scholars, so the
high rate of PhD completion reflects both this selection and the effects of the pro-
gram. Indeed, in a 2007 survey, 67% of current and former fellows responded
that they would have or might have aspired to earn a PhD absent the program
(Rose, 2012). The MMUF may still help students turn these goals into reality,
and inspire those who would not have otherwise considered an academic ca-
reer to explore one, but fellows are probably quite different from other students
in their underlying propensity to complete a PhD. It also may be the case that
students who have already completed the program overstate their chances of
pursuing PhDs in its absence. Without a doubt some current and former fel-
lows would have aspired to earn PhDs in the program’s absence, and so it is
useful to determine to what extent fellows’ high PhD completion rate is a result
of the program.
We address this issue by estimating the effect of a school’s MMUF partici-
pation per se and the intensity of participation on the number and rate of PhD
comple- tions by under-represented minority (URM) students.4By investigating
the outcomes of all URM students at an institution we are able to avoid this sam-
ple selection problem, and address the effect of the program on its medium-run
goal. Institutions have joined the program gradually over time, and this allows
us to control for time trends and cross-institution variation using institution and
4The Mellon Foundation considers throughput—the entry of its fellows into PhD pro-
grams—to be a key metric for assessing the undergraduate components of the program (Ben-
gochea, 2013). While the PhD completion rate of the URM student body as a whole is not an
explicit program goal, the best available data for causal analysis limit our focus to completion
and to an estimate of the treatment effect on an average URM student at a participant school
rather than a Mellon Mays fellow specifically. We believe that this average treatment effect is an
appropriate metric for evaluation, as it is closely linked to the pipeline problem that is the raison
d’etre for the MMUF, and any increase in fellows’ PhD completion that results from the program
should also increase the overall number of URM students completing PhDs.
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year fixed effects. However, due to the lengthy nature of PhD programs we do
not observe the completions of many of those who will eventually earn a PhD,
especially in later cohorts. Time to degree is in general longer for URM stu-
dents than for other students, exacerbating the problem. We estimate the size of
this truncation using data from those who graduated in the early years of our
dataset, and conduct the bulk of our analyses using this adjusted data.
While our focus is on a single fellowship, many other programs share the
broad goals and methods of the MMUF. To our knowledge these programs have
not been evaluated in the economics literature, but several prior studies in the
education literature have explored their effects. Most of this work has been
purely correlational, which is problematic as students who participate are quite
different from those who do not. Other analyses have used propensity score
matching to construct an appropriate control group of students, but participants
may still differ from non-participants in important but unobservable ways (e.g.
Eagan et al., 2013). We contribute to this literature by using a design that allows
us to avoid the issue of student selection, addressing problems of truncation in
degree data, and analyzing a program whose causal effects are unknown.
We estimate the average effect of an institution’s participation in the MMUF
program and find no statistically significant effect of the program when con-
sidering only the MMUF schools. These findings persist when we account for
truncation and when we add control groups constructed through propensity
score matching. We also find no effect of adding an additional fellow or in-
creasing the percentage of URM students who are fellows. This is particularly
notable as these estimates may suffer from positive selection bias: institutions
are able to move funds from year to year, awarding more fellowships in years
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with relatively strong applicant pools and fewer in other years. In addition, our
confidence intervals rule out a causal effect of more than one additional PhD per
cohort on average, with an average cohort size of 4.8 students. Whether that ef-
fect is meaningful is open to interpretation. If we assume that about a quarter
of fellows will eventually go on to complete PhDs, it suggests the MMUF is
supporting some students who would complete PhDs anyway. Because we are
evaluating a small program using aggregate data, it is possible the program has
an effect that is too small for us to distinguish. It may also be that the MMUF
is important to participants in other ways that do not significantly increase the
number of PhDs, or that our truncation adjustments do not adequately capture
changes in the time to degree over time.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
and further detail on the program structure and history. Section 2.3 describes
our data and methods. Section 2.4 presents results and Section 2.5 discusses
these results and our conclusions.
2.2 Background and Program Structure
2.2.1 Background
Colleges and universities pursue faculty diversity for several reasons. First, if
minority faculty members are better at connecting with minority students, ei-
ther in the classroom or as mentors and role models, their presence might be
important to the persistence and graduation rates of minority students. There is
some evidence that minority students are more likely to persist in STEM majors
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if they have an introductory STEM course that is taught by a minority profes-
sor (Price, 2010), and that gaps between minority and non-minority commu-
nity college students in pass rates, grades, and courses dropped are smaller
when classes are taught by professors who are minorities themselves (Fairlie,
Hoffmann, & Oreopoulos, 2011). Second, to the extent that raw teaching and
research potential are distributed throughout the population, hiring underrep-
resented minorities at a very low rate implies that institutions are losing out
on important groups of potential faculty. Finally, diversity may be pursued for
its own merits. It can stimulate a dynamic academic atmosphere, enriching the
work and lives of all faculty and students; address societal inequalities; or bring
academic attention to a wider range of issues that would otherwise be the case.
In recent data, 6.14% of the US citizens or permanent residents earning a PhD
reported that they were Black, while 6.3% reported that they were Hispanic (Na-
tional Science Foundation, 2012). These numbers are substantially higher than
at the inception of the MMUF (4.8% and 3.6% in 1985 respectively), but still quite
low relative to the US population, which was 12.3% Black and 16.7% Hispanic
in 2011 (United States Census Bureau, 2011). There is also substantial variation
across fields, with Black students earning 13% of PhDs in education but only
3% of those in physical sciences, and Hispanic students earning 8% of PhDs in
social sciences and 4.5% of those in the physical sciences (NSF, 2012). While de-
partments in some fields might find a diverse range of job candidates others are
still constrained in their ability to hire from underrepresented minority groups.
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2.2.2 The Mellon Minority/Mays Undergraduate Fellowship
Program
The MMUF program began with eight institutions, which joined the program
in late 1988 and recruited their first fellows in the spring of 1989. Additional
cohorts joined in 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2007. A group of Historically Black
Colleges and Universities has partic- ipated since 1989 through a consortium
administered by the United Negro College Fund (UNCF).5 Not counting this
consortium, 42 institutions participated in the program in 2014 (Mellon Mays
Undergraduate Fellowship, 2013). A table of the institutions in our sample and
the year they joined the program appears in Appendix Table B.1.
Participating institutions select fellows, generally targeting students in the
spring of their sophomore year. Schools are provided with funding for up to
five fellows per year, though they are able to select more fellows in some years
by moving funds from one school year to another, or if students who were previ-
ously selected drop out of the program. In the early years of the program fellow-
ships were restricted to those belonging to underrepresented minority groups.
However, in response to concerns from participating institutions about the le-
gality and ethics of affirmative action and other race-based programs, eligibility
was extended in 2003 to students of all backgrounds who were committed to
the program’s goal of increasing the presence of underrepresented minorities
in academia (Mellon Foundation, 2003). In addition to supporting the diversity
5The UNCF is a consortium of 37 private Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HB-
CUs) and among the most well-known of these institutions are Clark Atlanta, Fisk, Morehouse
and Spelman. The consortium is permitted to choose up to 25 fellows a year from across their
member institutions. As of the Spring of 2015, 614 fellows had been selected. Ninety of these
fellows had completed PhDs and 71 more were enrolled in PhD programs at that time. Our
analyses exclude the UNCF consortium for rea- sons described in the methods section.
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goals of the program, fellows must be pursuing a major in one of the Mellon-
designated fields. These span the humanities, social sciences, and natural sci-
ences, but do not include all majors. A list of the fields for 2000 and 2008 is
included in Appendix Table B.2.
Students apply directly to the fellowship program at their institution. Al-
though each institution has considerable discretion in evaluating applicants,
they are asked to consider the student’s field and either minority status or com-
mitment to the program’s goals, as well as academic promise, interest in an
academic career, and potential as a mentor. Once selected as fellows, students
work with mentors and attend seminars at their home institution. Because
of the decentralized nature of the program, each participating school decides
how to implement the mentorship and seminar components. Mentors are in-
tended to act as graduate school advisers—much as a pre-law or pre-med ad-
viser would—and to oversee the student’s independent research. Seminars are
in general focused on research and preparation for graduate school, and are
intended also to allow students to form a group identity. Fellows also receive
stipends both during the school year and over the summer to allow them to fo-
cus on research rather than paid work, and to potentially allow for fieldwork or
study at another institution over the summer. The MMUF administers regional
and national conferences at which students can present work, be exposed to the
work done by other fellows, and network with current and former fellows.
After college graduation, fellows who attend graduate school in a desig-
nated field can be eligible to participate in seminars and conferences, apply for
grants expressly for former undergraduate fellows, and receive loan for- give-
ness. The seminars and conferences include an annual conference similar to
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that attended by undergraduates as well as programs focused on writing grants
and disserta- tions. There are also retreats for those in the dissertation- writ-
ing phase. Loans taken out for undergraduate and graduate study are eligible
for loan forgiveness, up to a total of $10,000 if the student completes a PhD in
a Mellon-designated field. Loan forgiveness is only available to those who at-
tend a PhD or terminal Masters’ program in one of the designated fields, and
requires the fellow to begin his or her program within about 3 years of gradua-
tion or submit an appeal.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Data and Sample
Our analyses use data from the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data Sys-
tem (IPEDS), a restricted access version of the National Science Foundation’s
Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED), and restricted access administrative data
from the Mellon Foundation. The IPEDS includes institution-level information
on enrollment, costs and finances, faculty, and other characteristics for all col-
leges and universities in the United States that receive federal funding. Data is
provided by institutions, and has been collected in 1987 and then annually since
1989. The Higher Education General Information System (HEGIS), the prede-
cessor to IPEDS, includes data for earlier years, dating back to 1966. Many of the
variables in the HEGIS data are the same or similar to those in IPEDS, but HEGIS
includes less information and was collected less frequently. From these systems
we obtain institution-level information on the number of students completing
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bachelors’ degrees by race/ethnicity, gender, and field from 1985 through 2005.
We also use a larger set of institutional characteristics, drawn from the IPEDS
Delta Cost Project data, in order to construct matched comparison groups.
The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) is an annual census of PhD com-
pleters in the United States, sponsored by six federal entities and administered
since 1957. The SED achieves a high response rate, with 92% of those earning
PhDs responding in 2012, although item response rates are somewhat lower
(National Science Foundation, 2013). It includes information on demographics,
undergraduate and graduate study, and career plans. We use data from the SED
for those who completed a PhD between 1985 and 2011. From this population
we count the number of individuals who have completed a PhD by undergrad-
uate institution, year of bachelors’ degree, minority status, field, and gender.
We also obtain counts of the number completing a PhD a given number of years
after the bachelors’ degree by subgroup and year of bachelors’ degree. This data
on the distribution of times to PhD completion for the early cohorts in our sam-
ple is used to adjust for the fact that later cohorts have fewer years to complete a
PhD, and thus their numbers of PhD completers are understated due to sample
truncation.
The Mellon Foundation’s data provides counts of MMUF program fellows
at each participant institution in each year. The distribution of fellows by year
and school is depicted in Figure 2.1s. Although most institutions had 3–6 fel-
lows in most years of participation there is considerable variation in the num-
ber of fellows. In general, the smallest schools in terms of URM enrollment are
more likely to have fewer than 5 fellows in multiple years. We use this data
to calculate the ‘dosage’ of the program within the overall URM population of
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of MMUF Fellows by Graduation Year
each cohort at each institution. We then use this dosage and the raw numbers
of participants in extensions to our base model to account for the fact that we
would expect the treatment effect of this relatively small program to be more
pronounced—and easier to detect—at institutions where a greater proportion
of the URM population participated.
Our analyses focus on the 32 non-UNCF institutions that selected their first
fellows by 2005. The UNCF institutions are excluded because program partici-
pation at each UNCF school in any particular year is far more varied than at the
other U.S. institutions with most UNCF institutions having zero participants in
any given year. We are concerned that we would be unable to discern the effect
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of the program at these schools, and that the participation of a given institution
in the program in a particular year may be a strong signal about the propensity
of its students in that cohort to attend graduate school. We limit our analysis to
cohorts that graduated by 2005, as more recent graduates had completed rela-
tively few PhDs by 2011.
Most institutions in our sample are privately controlled (Table 2.1). A slight
majority grant doctorates, with the rest about evenly split between those that
only grant bachelor’s degrees and those that grant masters or first professional
degrees. In 1985, before the MMUF began, the average institution produced
slightly over 1,000 bachelors’ degrees, about 14% of which went to URM stu-
dents. About 11% of graduates went on to complete a PhD by 2011, with rates
fairly similar for URM and non-URM students. By 2005 the average institu-
tion produced about 1,300 bachelor’s degrees, with about 23% going to URM
students. Only 1.7% of these graduates completed a PhD by 2011, which is un-
surprising given that they only had 6 years to do so.
We focus primarily on the sample of URM students, based on the assump-
tion that the MMUF has the potential to affect PhD completions for those stu-
dents who are eligible to participate, but not those who are not eligible. In some
analyses we include PhD completions for non-minority students as a control
variable. While the introduction of a new fellowship opportunity could de-
crease competition for existing programs, change campus culture, or inspire the
peers of fellows to pursue a different path, we do not expect these factors to
be large, particularly as the program is relatively small, and its benefits are re-
stricted to fellows. To the extent that the benefits of the MMUF spill over to
those who are not eligible to participate, our estimates would understate the
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the Non-UNCF Institutions Participating in
the MMUF Program by 2005
N Mean SD
Public Control 32 0.125 0.336
Highest Degree
Bachelors 32 0.219 0.420
Doctorate 32 0.594 0.499
Masters/first professional 32 0.188 0.397
Characteristics as of 1987
Enrollment 32 8901.4 7768.5
Tuition and fees per student 32 8834.22 3335.80
Percent of students who are undergraduates 32 0.734 0.217
1985 Graduates
URM BAs 32 214.1 495.9
non-URM BAs 32 831.7 610.6
Proportion of BAs awarded to URM students 32 0.145 0.202
2005 Graduates
URM BAs 31 333.1 269.6
non-URM BAs 31 989.5 702.5
Proportion of BAs awarded to URM students 31 0.229 0.12
PhD completion rate 31 0.017 0.03
Full sample, unadjusted
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 5.94 5.43
URM PhDs–arts and seicnes and engineering 693 6.47 5.91
URM PhDs–all fields 693 7.30 6.47
Full sample, simple truncation adjustment
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 7.37 6.58
URM PhDs—arts and sciences and engineering 693 7.99 7.12
URM PhDs—all fields 693 9.20 7.92
Full sample, 10 year truncation adjustment
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 6.94 6.16
URM PhDs—arts and sciences and engineering 693 7.66 6.84
URM PhDs—all fields 693 8.49 7.35
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full effect of the MMUF on PhD completion.
Our initial plan was to restrict the analysis to PhD completions in MMUF
fields, based on similar reasoning. We were forced to abandon this plan for sev-
eral reasons. First, IPEDS reports only one major per BA completer until 2000,
and two in later years. Thus students with more than one major before 2000,
or more than two after, could be eligible for the program but not be identifiable
in the data as being eligible. Second, a sizable number of students switch fields
between BA and PhD. Third, although more recent data contains detailed infor-
mation on undergraduate majors, HEGIS and IPEDS used a very broad coding
scheme for completers’ fields (two-digit CIP) until 1996. As a result we are un-
able to distinguish some of the MMUF fields in these early data. Finally, even
with perfect data we would not be able to define which students were eligible
for the program based on fields, both because institutions had some discretion
to decide whether a field closely related to a MMUF field was eligible, and be-
cause documentation on which fields were eligible besfore 2000 does not exist.
Instead we restrict the sample by broad categories of fields—arts and sciences;
arts, sciences, and engineering; and all fields—rather than using a more specific
definition of eligible fields. All MMUF fields from 2000 and 2008 fall into arts
and sciences, which includes humanities, social sciences, life sciences, and phys-
ical sciences. The arts, sciences, and engineering group adds engineering fields.
The all fields category includes all BAs or doctorates, including those in arts,
humanities, and engineering, as well as fields such as education and business.
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2.3.2 Method
Using the Survey of Earned Doctorates, we amass data on the number of grad-
uates of a given institution in a given year who have since gone on to earn a
PhD.6 This is done separately for minority and non-minority students, by the
broad field groups described above. We define BAsJit as the number of indi-
viduals in group J (URM or non-URM) who completed bachelor’s’ degrees at
institution i in year t, and PhDsJit as the number of those individuals who com-
pleted a PhD by 2011, when our information on PhD completion ends.
In our baseline specification we regress the PhD completion count for URM
students (PhDsMit) on the count of BAs awarded to that cohort (BAsMit) and
whether the institution was participating in the program when that cohort was
eligible to be selected to participate (MMFit). We also include graduation year
fixed effects (Tt) in order to control for variations over time in the number of
bachelors’ graduates completing PhDs nationally, and institution fixed effects
(Ii). Because the dependent variable is a count, we estimate a negative binomial
model,7 assuming an exponential functional form so that the mean of PhDsMit
is given by:
E (PhDsMit) = Ii exp (β1MMFit + β2BAsMit + Tt)
We also estimate the baseline equation with the addition of the count for
non-minority students (PhDsNMit) included as an explanatory variable, but we
6We also study the PhD completion rate, defined as the proportion of BAs from a given
institution in a given year who go on to earn PhDs during our sample. We find that models
using PhD counts are easier to interpret, but rate models are discussed as a robustness check,
and full results are available in appendix B.
7Our tests indicate overdispersion, so we favor negative binomial regression. Poisson esti-
mation yields very similar results and so is not reported here. Table 2.2 includes an OLS model
for comparison.
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find that this does not significantly alter our findings and so exclude it from
later analyses. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Baseline Estimates
Results from the baseline specification are displayed in Table 2.2. Despite the
benefits of the MMUF felt by its participants, the model is unable to detect any
impact of the program on the PhD production of URM graduates. We find no
significant effect of the program on PhD completions, and point estimates are
mostly less than zero, suggesting small decreases in the number of PhDs com-
pleted. Using the negative binomial model, an increase in PhD completions in
the arts and sciences larger than 1.001 PhDs per participating school per cohort
lies outside a 95% confidence interval. By comparison, the OLS model allows an
increase as large as 1.47 within the 95% confidence interval. Results are similar
when we include the non-minority PhD completion counts (Table 2.3 columns
2 and 4) and when considering degrees in all fields.
Because more schools have joined the MMUF program over time, and later
cohorts suffer greater truncation, our baseline model likely understates the im-
pact of the program. For example, a student who completed his or her bache-
lor’s degree in 2002 has only 9 years to complete a PhD by 2011, the last year
of data available to us on PhD completions. This number is below the median
time to degree for some fields, and thus will miss more than half of the poten-
tial PhDs. Because PhDs in progress at the time of measurement are treated
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Table 2.2: Effect of MMUF Participation on URM PhD Production:
Model Comparison
Model OLS Negative Binomial
(a) A&S 0.466 -0.151
(0.514) (0.588)
(b) A&S + Eng. 0.343 -0.273
(0.515) (0.567)
(c) All Fields 0.525 -0.141
(0.508) (0.564)
Notes: Six models are reported: for each model, the dependent variable
is the number of PhD completions among those non-white, non-Asian
students who graduated from an institution in a particular year, with
degrees in a particular group of fields as indicated by (a), (b), and (c).
All models include the BA completion count for that cohort, as well as
year and institution fixed effects. Coefficients are reported for the OLS
model and marginal effects are reported for the negative binomial model.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
as though they will never be completed, the PhD production rate would ap-
pear to be declining over time if it were constant. Then, because the MMUF
program is introduced throughout our sample period, participation effects are
confounded with truncation effects. URM students take longer on average to
complete PhDs, so controlling for the equivalent non- minority count does not
eliminate the problem of truncation. Differences in time to degree are illus-
trated in Figure 2.2, which presents the distribution of PhD completion times
for all SED respondents who completed their BA in the US and are US citizens
or permanent residents.8 Indeed, Table 2.3 demonstrates that including infor-
mation on non-URM PhD completions hardly affects the estimates of program
8This figure understates the difference in degree completion time somewhat, as URM stu-
dents make up a larger proportion of PhD completions in later cohorts, and members of later
cohorts with particularly long times to degree do not appear in the data.
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Table 2.3: Effect of MMUF Participation on URM PhD Production:
Unadjusted Model
(1) (2)
(a) A&S -0.151 -0.222
(0.588) (0.561)
(b) A&S + Eng. -0.273 -0.389
(0.567) (0.552)
(c) All Fields -0.141 -0.221
(0.564) (0.550)
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported.
For each model, the dependent variable is the number of PhD comple-
tions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from
an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of
fields as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include the BA com-
pletion count for that cohort, as well as year and institution fixed effects.
Specification (2) includes the comparable PhD count for white and Asian
students. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
participation at all.
In order to improve this estimate we implement two strategies to adjust for
the fact that we do not observe PhDs in progress. The first takes the distribution
of time to PhD that prevailed in the first 5 years of our sample and applies
it to the remainder of the data. That is, we predict how many of those who
have completed bachelor’s degrees but are not recorded as having completed
PhDs them will eventually complete a PhD, and use that to form our estimate
of PhD completions. We do this separately for URM and non-URM students.
Students from these early cohorts have at least 20 years post-college to finish
their graduate degrees, so truncation is likely to be a much smaller problem.
If this method captures truncation patterns accurately it puts all cohorts on an
equal footing. The disadvantage of this approach is that it makes the strong
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Figure 2.2: Time to PhD Distributions by Minority Status
assumption that the time-to-PhD distribution is fixed over time.9
To address this latter concern, we estimate a second model where we allow
the truncation pattern to change over time. We do this by estimating a quadratic
model on early cohorts for each number of years from BA y, where t is the num-
ber of years from 1985:
Pr (Complete within y years) = α0 + α1t + α2t2
We then apply this to the rest of the sample as before. Similarly to the previ-
ous approach, we would like to fit the prediction model to a set of data where
9In fact, formal statistical tests that we conducted suggest that this assumption is not strictly
true.
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Table 2.4: Effect of MMUF Participation on URM PhD Production:
Truncation Adjustments
(1) (2)
(a) A&S 0.134 0.391
(0.737) (0.765)
(b) A&S + Eng. 0.037 0.393
(0.731) (0.795)
(c) All Fields 0.211 0.518
(0.779) (0.787)
Simple Adjustment !
10-Year Adjustment !
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported.
For each model, the dependent variable is the number of PhD comple-
tions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from
an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of
fields as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include the BA com-
pletion count for that cohort, as well as year and institution fixed effects.
The simple adjustment is a truncation adjustment under the assumption
that the time to PhD pattern from 1985–1989 persists throughout the sam-
ple. The 10-year adjustment is a truncation adjustment with a quadratic
model in time fit to the first 10 years of data. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
truncation is less problematic. We therefore run specifications where this pre-
diction model is applied to the first 10 years of data (1985–1994).10 Table 2.4
displays results after correcting for truncation. The results of the first, ‘fixed’
truncation model are presented in the first column, while those from 10-year
quadratic model are presented in column 2.
Both methods of correcting for truncation produce similar results—adopting
the MMUF does not appear to have a significant effect on an institution’s URM
10We investigated a similar quadratic model using the first five years of data, and the results
were qualitatively similar.
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PhD completions. Using the same method as before, the largest potential effect
size for arts and sciences within a 95% CI of the point estimate is 1.89 PhDs
per cohort for the model under the 10-year truncation adjustment. The point
estimate itself predicts only 0.518 additional PhDs per cohort—larger than the
estimates produced without correcting for truncation, but not statistically sig-
nificant.
Our analyses so far have used only the MMUF schools, using those institu-
tions in years before they began participating in the program as controls. Al-
though our estimates are fairly precise, we would like to introduce additional
control observations. Estimating the program effect using the sample of all U.S.
institutions would greatly overstate the effects of the program, as many MMUF
institutions were selected for participation in the program specifically because
they are high-quality colleges and universities where PhD production is already
high. Instead we select two matched control groups constructed using the Stata
command psmatch2 to estimate the probability that each institution would be
selected to participate in the MMUF program based on its observable character-
istics.11 The first control group uses 1-nearest-neighbor matching to select the
non-treated institution with the nearest propensity score to each treated insti-
tution as an appropriate control.12 We match with replacement, meaning that a
non-treated school can serve as the match for more than one treated school if no
other non-treated school is a ‘better’ control.
The second matched control group is constructed using kernel matching
to construct an appropriate control institution from a combination of non-
11The CUNY schools are excluded from this approach, as their information on the predictor
variables we use is reported at the system level and thus we cannot separate treated from non-
treated CUNY schools.
12We estimated the same models with Malahnobis-metric matching and obtained qualita-
tively similar results.
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Table 2.5: Effect of MMUF participation on URM PhD Production:
Matched Comparison
(1) (2)
(a) A&S 0.205 0.127
(0.586) (0.653)
(b) A&S + Eng. 0.143 0.131
(0.631) (0.700)
(c) All Fields 0.301 0.219
(0.630) (0.726)
1 Nearest Neighbor !
Kernel !
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported.
For each model, the dependent variable is the predicted number of PhD
completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated
from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group
of fields as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation adjust-
ment with a quadratic model in time fit to the first 10 years of data. All
models include the BA completion count for that cohort, as well as year
and institution fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
participating schools. A list of the variables employed in the matching routine
appears as Appendix Table B.3, and a list of the schools in the 1-nearest neighbor
match appears as Appendix Table B.4.
Results from the matching procedures are presented in Table 2.5. These es-
timates employ the 10-year flexible truncation correction described above. We
find no evidence that participation affected the PhD completion count in arts
and sciences, and in fact our point estimates and their standard errors are very
close to those in Table 2.4 that do not include a matched comparison group.
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2.4.2 Estimates of Program Intensity
In addition to changes in whether a school was parsticipating in the MMUF in
a given year there is considerable variation in the size of a MMUF cohort for
a given school. This variation should improve our ability to identify the effect
of the program and offer an estimate of the effect of changing the size of the
program at an institution.
We do this first by estimating the effect of increasing the number of fellows
(MMFellowsit) on the number of PhDs completed by URM students (PhDsMit).
As in the baseline model we include year fixed effects (Tt) and institution fixed
effects (Ii). We include a control for the number of BAs completed by URM stu-
dents (BAsMit). Once again we estimate using negative binomial and regression
so the mean of PhDsMit is given by:
E (PhDsMit) = Ii exp (β1MMFellowsit + β2BAsMit + Tt)
We find uniformly positive point estimates for the effect of adding an addi-
tional fellow, but these estimates are not statistically significant at conventional
levels (Table 2.6). If correct, our estimates would imply that each student added
to the MMUF program adds about 0.171 arts and sciences PhDs that otherwise
would not have been completed. This null finding is particularly interesting as
the estimates include both the effect of adding a fellow and whatever factors
drove a school to add that fellow, which likely includes the strength of a given
cohort.
As an alternative to estimating the effect of adding a given number of fel-
lows, we estimate the following, where Dosageit is defined as the number of fel-
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Table 2.6: Effect of Intensity of MMUF Participation on URM PhD Produc-
tion
(1) (2)
(a) A&S 0.171 -0.582
(0.089) (2.567)
(b) A&S + Eng. 0.188** 0.961
(0.094) (2.646)
(c) All Fields 0.178 -0.947
(0.096) (4.019)
Count !
Dosage !
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported.
For each model, the dependent variable is the predicted number of PhD
completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated
from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group
of fields as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation ad-
justment with a quadratic model in time fit to the first 10 years of data.
All models include the BA completion count for that cohort, as well as
year and institution fixed effects. Column (1) presents estimates of the
marginal effect of adding an additional fellow on the number of PhDs
completed. Column (2) presents estimates of the marginal effect of in-
creasing the program size as a proportion of the non-white, non-Asian
graduating class. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institu-
tion.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
lows from graduation cohort t at institution i divided by the number of URM
students in that cohort and institution. This model gives the expectation of
PhDsMit as:
E (PhDsMit) = Ii exp (β1Dosageit + β2BAsMit + Tt)
Increasing the dosage of the program appears to decrease the PhD comple-
tion count for all field groups but arts and sciences plus engineering, although
this association is nowhere statistically significant. Once again, using a 95%
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confidence interval around the negative binomial model’s estimate for arts and
sciences we could rule out a change in expected arts and sciences PhD comple-
tions of more than 4.45 per cohort from a 100% increase in the program dosage.
This would correspond to expanding the MMUF to cover each school’s entire
URM population, and in that context is quite a small effect.
2.4.3 Robustness
We explore the possibility that the adoption of the MMUF program is not ran-
dom by investigating whether there are any changes in PhD completions up to
5 years before and up to 5 years after program adoption. For this analysis we
focus on the data adjusted using the 10-year truncation model. We find some
evidence of an increase in PhD production for all three degree groups 5 years
before the first cohort was eligible to participate (Table 2.7). However, no trend
is apparent. This may suggest that our truncation adjustment is insufficient to
account for the issue of degrees in progress, or simply be a data artifact.
Rather than analyzing the number of PhDs completed by URM students, it is
possible to instead consider the PhD completion rate—the percentage of URM
bachelors’ recipients who go on to complete a PhD. This model would be more
appropriate than those discussed previously if institutions with larger numbers
of URM students completing bachelors’ degrees could expect greater gains, as
might be the case if the fellowship somehow changed the expectations or at-
titudes of both non-participants and participants. This strategy also allows us
to experiment with weighting observations by the number of URM bachelors’
degrees. This simple weighting scheme has the potential to increase precision,
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Table 2.8: Effect of MMUF Participation on the URM PhD Completion
Rate: Unadjusted Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) A&S 0.011 -0.001 0.013 -0.001
(0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005)
(b) A&S + Eng. -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
(c) All Fields -0.014 -0.005 -0.014 -0.005
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Weights ! !
Non-URM PhD completion rate ! !
Notes: OLS coefficients from twelve models are reported. For each
model, the dependent variable is the rate of PhD completion among
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institu-
tion in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of fields as
indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include year and institution
fixed effects. Specifications (3) and (4) include the comparable rate for
white and Asian students. Weights are by size of institution in number
of URM BA completers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively.
but is only optimal if the effect of the program on completion rates is homoge-
nous across institutions and the likelihood of PhD completion is not correlated
within institution cohorts after controlling for institution and year fixed effects
(Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2015). Because these assumptions may not be
satisfied we also report the unweighted results. Using our baseline specifica-
tions, we find no evidence that the MMUF increases PhD completion rates, and
are able to rule out increases larger than five percentage points as outside of a
95% confidence interval of any of the baseline models (Table 2.8). Results from
other specifications lead us to similar conclusions as those using the number of
PhDs completed, and are presented in Appendix B (Appendix Tables B.5–B.7).
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We also conduct our baseline estimates with institution-specific linear trends
to allow for the possibility that each institution follows its own trend. The re-
sults are similar to those found without the inclusion of institution-specific time
trends, and are not included for brevity.
2.5 Conclusion
We describe the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program, the supports
it offers its participants, and its growth over time. Using a census of undergrad-
uate completions from the Department of Education as well as a census of PhD
completions from the National Science Foundation, we then attempt to estimate
the causal effect of the MMUF program on the PhD completions of URM bach-
elors’ graduates at participant schools. We find no statistically significant effect
of an institution’s participation in the program and a 95% confidence interval
rules out an effect of more than about 1 PhD per cohort using our baseline esti-
mates. We also find no significant effect of increasing the number or percentage
of fellows, although we do find predominantly positive point estimates for the
number of fellows that would suggest an effect of about 0.171 additional PhDs
for each additional fellow. In both cases these estimates are small relative to
the 25% of MMUF fellows who are expected to complete PhDs—suggesting an
upper bound of 68% on the proportion of MMUF fellows who complete PhDs
who would not have done so otherwise.
Several factors could explain our null findings. First, the program may sim-
ply not do much to increase the number of PhDs produced by URM students.
If the program selects the brightest and most motivated students it may benefit
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those who would have already been likely to attend graduate school and earn
PhDs even in its absence. This would not necessarily mean that the MMUF is
unimportant—the program could increase the quality of the institutions fellows
attend for their doctoral studies, improve dissertations produced or job skills
gained, speed completion, or improve the financial position of graduates. Any
of these effects could increase the number of URM students entering academia,
in addition to being beneficial to fellows, but we are not able to capture them in
our data. The Survey of Earned Doctorates is collected at the time of PhD com-
pletion and thus is limited in its ability to measure most variables pertaining to
careers in academia. Second, the small size of the program at each institution
might inhibit our ability to discover an overall effect with statistical models: if
only a handful of students in each year are MMUF participants, the largest pos-
sible effect the program could have on PhD production will similarly be small.
Despite our rather precise estimates we may be failing to detect a real, but small,
effect of the program. This is less likely given the insignificant effects we find
for increases in program intensity, but those are still complicated by the substan-
tial noise of PhD completions by non-fellows. Finally, our truncation correction
could simply be incorrect. If the true truncation pattern is not fit or well approx-
imated by any of our models we may fail to find results where any exist. The
true distribution of degree completion times is unknowable until all degrees can
be observed, so we cannot rule out this possibility.
Our findings are most generalizable to expansions of the MMUF to institu-
tions relatively similar to those that already participate or increases in the size
of the program at MMUF institutions. Many MMUF schools are quite unlike
the average U.S. institution and were selected in part based on their high PhD-
going rates and a perception that many students had the potential and prepara-
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tion for a career in academia. However, the program has also been implemented
at institutions selected more for the diverse populations they serve (e.g. CUNY
schools), where overall student preparation may not be as high. It would be
interesting to extend our study to the subsample of the CUNY schools and the
state universities that were later introduced to the program, but that shrinks the
pool of observations too greatly to draw meaningful conclusions from the data.
There are also other programs that are broadly similar to the MMUF (such as
the McNair Scholars Program) to which these same empirical methods could be
applied.
Despite the caveats listed above, we hope our findings will prove instructive
to designers of future policies. If a program aims to maximize its impact on
the number of students achieving any particular benchmark it is impor- tant
not only to design the program to benefit its recipients but also to select those
recipients on the margin of the desired outcome.
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CHAPTER 3
SELECTION AND CHRONIC DISEASE RESEARCH: THE
SEATBELT–DIABETES LINK
Gary R. Cohen
3.1 Introduction
Chocolate consumption is linked to lower rates of heart disease, diabetes and
stroke (Buitrago-Lopez et. al, 2011). Moderate alcohol consumption can reduce
the risk of coronary heart disease, but may increase the risk of breast cancer
(Hankinson, Colditz, Manson & Speizer). Red meat consumption increases the
risk of cardiovascular disease and early death (Pan et. al, 2012). We are inun-
dated daily with such health statistics and their corresponding lifestyle advice,
much of which is derived from observational studies. But how good is that
advice, really?
Examine the case of red meat. Pan et. al (2012) study two epidemiological
datasets with over 120,000 combined respondents and 2.96 million person-years
of follow-up data. They find a 13% increase in cardiovascular disease (CVD)
mortality for the highest quintile of red meat eaters relative to the lowest quin-
tile. A similar study examining a different dataset of over half a million people
aged 50 to 71 finds a more striking result: 27% and 50% higher CVD mortality
associated with red meat consumption for men and women, respectively (Sinha
et. al, 2009). But can these studies support causal claims? Many epidemiologists
think not. An editor’s correspondence (de Abreu Silva & Marcadenti, 2009) fol-
lows the latter article, positing that red meat consumption “may be a marker of
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a higher-risk lifestyle and not a risk factor itself.” Evidence from randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) seems to support the editors’ assertion: a meta-analysis
of 8 RCTs finds no effect of beef consumption relative to poultry and/or fish
consumption on the fasting lipid profile, an important set of risk factors for
CVD (Maki et. al, 2012). A second meta-analysis of 146 observational studies
and 43 RCTs (Mente et. al, 2009) finds insufficient evidence for any association
of meat, saturated fat or total fat intake with coronary heart disease. And while
it is possible that red meat has an effect on CVD but not the fasting lipid pro-
file, or that it causes premature death from CVD but not coronary heart disease,
these hypotheses seem unlikely to account for the entire difference in findings.
So what explains the discrepancy?
The likely culprit, as predicted by de Abreu Silva and Marcadenti, is human
behavior – a relatively new problem for epidemiologists. In the past, epidemi-
ology was for the most part a biological science: one could monitor the spread
of, and risk factors for, infectious disease using relatively simple statistical tools.
But within the last century, we have witnessed an “epidemiological transition”
(Omran, 1971): people are dying less from infectious disease and more from
chronic disease – from their own decisions. Of particular concern for researchers
is that individuals make these decisions based on factors which may be unob-
served or unobservable, and often with the explicit goal of targeting long-term
health outcomes. In this case observational studies – like the red meat studies
presented above – fall prey to serious biases compared to randomized trials.
The groups they compare are not actually comparable, because individuals do
not randomly select into treatment and control groups. It is for this reason that
economists term this problem “selection bias.”
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The problems created by selection bias for causal inference are well-known
in the economics literature (e.g. LaLonde, 1986). Less well-known is the po-
tential magnitude of selection bias in the health literature. Large effect sizes
can mitigate the weaknesses of observational data: the CDC (2012) reports that
smoking causes a 23-fold increase in lung cancer risk in men. Such enormous
associations are unlikely to be due to bias – and the bigger the effect size, the
more sound the evidence (Ioannidis, 2005). But what effect size is “too small?”
Even less discussed is the possibility that epidemiological studies may them-
selves introduce selection bias into future investigations. In chronic disease epi-
demiology, individuals’ observed behaviors (eating red meat, exercising regu-
larly) represent the outcomes of decisions those individuals make to balance
their expected long-term health with their other desires. Introducing new in-
formation on the healthfulness of a particular behavior may change individu-
als’ decisions, even if that information is false. Furthermore, those most likely
to change their behavior in response to health information are – at the margin
– those who care most about their health, those who have the best access to
health information, or those who are most likely to comply with doctors’ rec-
ommendations. These groups most likely would have been more healthy in the
first place, and future studies may find even more pronounced effects simply
because those past studies changed the composition of treatment and control
groups. But does this happen in practice?
Ideally, we could address these questions by assigning false health advice to
a group of subjects, and monitoring shifts in their health behaviors relative to
a control group. We could then observe the changing health ‘risk’ of the activ-
ity by straightforwardly comparing the health of compliers and non-compliers.
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However, this is clearly unfeasible for numerous reasons both ethical (because it
is deliberately deceptive) and technical (e.g. contamination of the control group
by information sharing).
Instead, I choose to study the long-term health ‘effects’ of a spurious cause:
seatbelt use. While seatbelt non-use can obviously contribute to the risk of an
acute injury, it should be all but irrelevant for the risks of chronic diseases like
diabetes. However, people who choose not to wear their seatbelt may care less
about their health in general, or may be less compliant with health recommen-
dations – because seatbelt use is strongly recommended by most everyone. I
also examine whether the passage of seatbelt laws affects the observed long-
term health ‘risks’ of seatbelt non-use. If those who begin wearing their seatbelt
in response to a law parallel those who would change their behavior in response
to medical advice, I should observe an increase in the long-term health ‘risks’ of
seatbelt non-use after the passage of a seatbelt law.
In the following sections, I demonstrate that seatbelt use is highly correlated
with health behaviors, socioeconomic status and access to healthcare. I will
also demonstrate that the selection bias associated with seatbelt use is large in
magnitude and – after controlling for observables – is monotonically related to
the risk of disease. I will further show that there is some suggestive evidence
that seatbelt laws may amplify the selection problem by leaving the least healthy
individuals in the non–seatbelt-using categories.
101
3.2 Data
I use data from two sources to address these questions. First is the CDC’s Be-
havioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), an annual random telephone
survey conducted in each U.S. state and territory. The BRFSS asks about health
conditions; health behaviors; lifestyle decisions; access to healthcare; and demo-
graphics such as age, race, gender, education and income. Because the survey
does not follow individuals over time, I assemble the data into a repeated cross-
section covering the fifty U.S. states and Washington, D.C. When I exclude years
where respondents are not surveyed on seatbelt use, my sample covers approx-
imately 2 million respondents from 1984–1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010.
I examine six long-term health outcomes: high blood pressure, high choles-
terol, diabetes, coronary heart disease, heart attack, and stroke. The first four are
chronic diseases, while the latter two are acute health events with chronic risk
factors. Because the questions are asked in different years, each outcome has a
different effective sample: these samples and the means of outcome variables
and the seatbelt variable are summarized in Table 3.1.
Second is a dataset from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
which summarizes the seatbelt laws in each state plus D.C., along with the dates
of passage for both the first seatbelt law and – if any – the first primary enforce-
ment law. Under a primary enforcement law, an individual can be stopped by a
police officer solely for not wearing a seatbelt; under non-primary enforcement,
the individual must be stopped for a different offense but can be levied an ad-
ditional penalty for not wearing a seatbelt. Because these two styles of law
may provide different incentives, or because non-primary enforcement laws
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Table 3.1: Means and Sample Characteristics of Key Variables
Variable Mean Observations Years Available
Health Outcome:
High Blood Pressure 23.1% 925,997 1984–2002
High Cholesterol 27.5% 567,239 1987–2002
Diabetes 8.8% 2,187,232 1988–2010
Coronary Heart Disease 6.3% 1,219,103 1996–2010
Heart Attack 6.1% 1,219,103 1996–2010
Stroke 4.0% 1,219,103 1996–2010
Seatbelt Use:
Always 72.3% 2,326,167 1984–2010
Almost Always 12.6% 2,326,167 1984–2010
Sometimes 6.7% 2,326,167 1984–2010
Rarely 3.5% 2,326,167 1984–2010
Never 4.4% 2,326,167 1984–2010
may have a stronger ratio of information content to actual pecuniary or legal
punishment, I study their effects separately.
Before proceeding with the analysis, I take some time to explore the features
of the data – especially the ways in which seatbelt users differ from non-seatbelt
users.
3.2.1 Characteristics of Seatbelt Users and Non-Users
The BRFSS asks respondents are asked how often they wear their seatbelts while
riding in a motor vehicle, on a five-point scale from ‘always’ to ‘never.’ I stratify
the data by these self-reported use categories, and in Figures 3.1 through 3.4
I compute conditional means and standard errors of the mean for a variety of
variables of interest.
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Figure 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of Seatbelt Users
Examining the figures, we first see the curious pattern in age: those who
wear their seatbelt less often are younger on average, although the trend re-
verses for the category who report never wearing their seatbelt. This may be
due to two simultaneous relationships: that older individuals are more consci-
entious and more likely to wear their seatbelt, and that older individuals were
raised before the passage of seatbelt laws and possibly before the advent of seat-
belts. Predictably, we also see that women are overrepresented in the highest
categories of seatbelt use relative to men. However, there is no simple trend in
body mass index, and furthermore many of the differences between groups are
statistically insigniffcant even at the 5% level.
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Figure 3.2: Education and Income of Seatbelt Users
The trends in the next figure are more interesting. Individuals who wear
their seatbelt more often are less likely to be high school dropouts, more likely
to be college graduates, less likely to have very low incomes and more likely
to have high incomes. The associations over education support the idea that
seatbelt users may be better equipped to respond to health advice, while those
over income also suggest that they may have greater means to do so.
Surely enough, these predictions carry through for health behaviors. Seat-
belt users exercise more often, drink less, smoke less, eat less fat and more fruits
and vegetables. They also have better access to preventative care, or utilize it
more: more seatbelt users have seen doctors and dentists within the past year,
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Figure 3.3: Health Behaviors of Seatbelt Users
more have seen a doctor within the past five years, and more have gotten flu
shots within the past year. Because seatbelt users are wealthier on average, it is
not surprising that they have greater access to healthcare – but greater health-
care utilization can contribute to selection bias as much as greater tastes for
health.
3.2.2 Relative Risks of Disease by Seatbelt Use
Above I have demonstrated that seatbelt non-use is associated with lower so-
cioeconomic status, more risky health behaviors, and reduced utilization of
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Figure 3.4: Healthcare Utilization of Seatbelt Users
health care. Figure 3.5 shows how these factors translate into relative risks for
disease, taking those who always wear their seatbelt as the reference group.
Never wearing one’s seatbelt appears to be a significant health risk for ev-
ery condition except high cholesterol. In some cases, the ‘relative risk’ is quite
high: for instance, those who never wear their seatbelts are at a 75% higher risk
of suffering a heart attack. Compare this to the relative risks of 13% to 50% re-
ported by the red meat studies, and the magnitude of the problem that selection
bias may pose for such studies becomes alarmingly clear. Even very significant-
looking effect sizes can be generated by totally spurious causes, if those ‘causes’
are related to other important variables like those in Figures 3.1 to 3.4.
107
Figure 3.5: Relative Disease Risk of Seatbelt Users
Two issues arise, however. First, the risks are not as great for other categories
of seatbelt use. Second, the increases are not monotonic. Those who ‘seldom’
wear their seatbelts do not have similar risks to those who ‘never’ wear their
seatbelts. And ‘almost always’ wearing a seatbelt seems to be healthier than
‘always’ wearing a seatbelt. A potential culprit: these associations are not con-
ditional on any other variables. They are confounded, for example, by patterns
in age and gender across categories of seatbelt use.
In order to see whether the ‘relative risks’ of seatbelt non-use can be elim-
inated by statistical control, and in order to learn more about the underlying,
unobservable variables that cause seatbelt non-users to be at greater risk, we
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must turn to the regression analysis. First, however, I will lay the groundwork
for addressing the second question: whether seatbelt laws exacerbated the se-
lection problem.
3.2.3 Basic Information about Seatbelt Laws
Laws mandating the use of seatbelts in motor vehicles were first passed in U.S.
states starting in the early 1980s. Under these laws, drivers pulled over for
speeding or other offenses could be levied additional penalties if they were
found to not be wearing their seatbelt. Presumably because this was an easy
system to evade (by buckling up between being flagged down by an officer
and being pulled over), a later wave of reforms allowed ‘primary enforcement:’
police officers could now stop drivers and penalize them for seatbelt non-use
alone. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 provide a feel for the timing of these two types of law
by plotting the number of states which adopt the law in each year against the
year.
These two figures show that the vast majority of primary enforcement laws
were passed after all non-primary laws had been passed in 1995. Every state
except New Hampshire has passed some form of seatbelt law, and 32 states and
the District of Columbia have primary enforcement laws.
The question remains, however, as to whether these different types of law
yield different types of incentive for individuals, and therefore ‘affect’ health
outcomes differently. The next section motivates the analysis of this question by
examining whether other behaviors changed after the passage of each type of
law.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Seatbelt Law Effective Years
3.2.4 Seatbelt Users Before and After Seatbelt Laws
Figures 3.8 through 3.12 stratify the data in a similar fashion to those in Section
3.2.1, but now I split the sample by whether or not the respondent’s state had a
seatbelt law in effect when the respondent was interviewed. Because the IIHS
data gives the dates of each law’s passage, and the BRFSS records the dates of its
interviews, I can do this quite precisely. In each set of four graphs, the top two
figures split the sample into periods before the passage of the first law and after
the passage of the first law, and the bottom two figures split the sample into
periods before the passage of a primary enforcement law and after the passage
of a primary enforcement law. Because we do not observe individuals over time,
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Primary Enforcement Law Effective Years
these show the average level of each activity for each group as a whole. If the
passage of seatbelt laws causes the marginally more healthy to select out of the
lower categories of seatbelt use and leave behind the least healthy individuals,
we should see the prevalence of unhealthy behaviors, the prevalence of low
education, etc. to rise in the lower categories of seatbelt use after the passage of
a law.
For brevity’s sake, I present a representative selection of the variables in Sec-
tion 3.2.1.
The figures tell a mixed story. For some variables, the passage of a law clearly
caused differential selection: there are fewer females in the lower categories of
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Figure 3.8: Gender of Seatbelt Users Before and After Laws
seatbelt use after the passage of each type of law. After the passage of a seatbelt
law, those still wearing their seatbelt infrequently appear to be heavier drinkers
than those who did not wear their seatbelts before the law’s passage, while those
who more frequently wear their seatbelts showed no change in behavior.
Other variables are harder to separate from their trends: average BMIs are
universally higher after the passage of seatbelt laws, but this should not be sur-
prising as average BMIs have been rising over time in America. Whether the
percent difference in BMI between the lowest and highest groups changes seems
to depend on which law is being considered. The percentage in every group
who are college graduates and who have seen a doctor in the past year also
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Figure 3.9: BMI of Seatbelt Users Before and After Laws
rises after the passage of each type of law, but this probably reflects increasing
access to education and healthcare over time.
Finally, some variables show very little. For example, the proportion at risk
for binge drinking appears to increase slightly in the lower categories of seatbelt
use after the passage of the first law, but when I examine the difference before
and after the passage of a primary law I see no change.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the impact of seatbelt laws on
selection is probably limited, and the selection out of seatbelt non-use due to
the threat of legal punishment may not be very correlated with tastes for health
overall. The threat of legal punishment is a quite different incentive than a doc-
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Figure 3.10: Drinks per Month of Seatbelt Users Before and After Laws
tor’s warning about future health risks. However, this preliminary evidence
is clearly confounded by pre-existing trends; the multivariate analysis will cir-
cumvent this problem.
3.3 Method
In a traditional regression model, there are three channels through which the
treatment variable X is associated with the outcome Y : the direct effect of X
on Y , the indirect effect of X on Y through their mutual association with other
observable variables O, and the indirect effect of X on Y through their mutual
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Figure 3.11: College Education of Seatbelt Users Before and After Laws
association with other unobservable variables u. The researcher’s goal is usually
to estimate the direct effect of X on Y by statistically controlling for O and using
some other method (e.g. instrumental variables, a Heckman (1979) selection
method) to circumvent the association with u.
My goal is slightly different. I have deliberately selected a treatment variable
(seatbelt non-use) with no direct effect on the outcome (chronic disease). There-
fore, any association between T and Y must be caused by mutual association
with X and U. Furthermore, by estimating a regression of X on Y and control-
ling for O, I can estimate the association between X and Y that is due only to
mutual association with unobserved and unobservable variables. After control-
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Figure 3.12: Doctor Checkups of Seatbelt Users Before and After Laws
ling for X, the regression coefficient on T will act as a reduced-form estimate
of the impacts of the unknown variables u on Y . In this manner I can obtain a
rough estimate of the possible magnitudes of the selection bias associated with
seatbelt non-use for each outcome. Although the size of these biases will not
generalize to other independent variables like meat or chocolate consumption,
they can at least give us a very rough picture of the magnitude of biases that
may result when the selection problem is not adequately addressed.
In addition, if I interact the independent variable X with an indicator of
whether or not a seatbelt law was in effect, I can determine whether the re-
lationship between X and Y through u changed after the passage of a seatbelt
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Figure 3.13: Illustration of Causal Model
law. If this yields a positive estimate, it would indicate that the relationship be-
tween seatbelt non-use and disease became stronger after the passage of a law –
evidence of increased selection. These questions naturally yield the regression
model:
Yist = β0 + αs + γt + Oitβ + Xitθ + XitTstφ + εit
Where the unit of observation is individual i in state s at time t, αs and γt
are state and time fixed effects, Oit is a matrix of individual level observable
controls,1 Xit it is a matrix of four of the five seatbelt use categories (those who
always wear their seatbelt are the excluded reference group) and Tist = 1 if there
1For all models, additional controls comprise age, age squared, race, smoking status, educa-
tion, employment status, marital status and income category.
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is a seatbelt law in effect in state s at time t.2 As a robustness check, I also
include state-specific linear and quadratic trends in additional specifications of
the model; however, I find that this does not alter my results substantially.
As mentioned above, θ > 0 is consistent with the existence of selection bias,
while φ > 0 is consistent with increased selection after the passage of a seatbelt
law. If seatbelt non-use has a monotonic relationship with the unobserved bias-
inducing variables (e.g. people who use their seatbelt less have lower tastes for
health) then the estimates of θ and φ should increase monotonically through the
categories of seatbelt non-use: the coefficients on ‘never’ should be greater than
‘seldom’, and so on. The findings from this model are tabulated in Tables 3.2
through 3.7.
3.4 Results
Tables 3.2 through 3.7 summarize the main findings of the paper. Strikingly,
the results almost perfectly support a monotonic relationship between seatbelt
non-use and unobserved determinants of long-term health outcomes: most of
the coeffcients on seatbelt use categories are highly significant and increase as
seatbelt use decreases. Because the data are in level form, coefficients should
be interpreted as percentage-point increases: in Table 2, Primary Enforcement,
Model 1, never wearing a seatbelt before the passage of a primary enforcement
law is associated with a 2.56 percentage-point increase in the risk of diabetes
(off of a baseline average of 8.79% – see Table 3.1); never wearing a seatbelt after
2I estimate one set of models for each type of law for each disease; for cardiovascular diseases
I only use primary enforcement laws because the first data points on CVD in BRFSS are for 1996
– a year after the passage of the last non-primary law.
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the passage of a primary enforcement law is associated with a 2.56 + 1.75 = 4.31
percentage-point increase in the risk of diabetes. With a baseline average of
8.79%, this represents a 49% higher relative risk of diabetes for those who never
wear their seatbelts.
While the evidence for selection bias is strong, the evidence for increased se-
lection due to seatbelt laws is weaker for most outcomes. The coefficients on the
interaction terms between seatbelt use and seatbelt laws are positive, monotonic
and quite significant for diabetes, but the same coefficients for other diseases are
not systematically positive or statistically distinguishable from zero.
Because the tables are very similar and the coefficients have the same inter-
pretations between models, I will not belabor the contents of each individual
table. A discussion of the general results follows.
3.5 Discussion
Overall, I find strong evidence of selection bias due to unobservables correlated
with seatbelt use. Once I control for observable characteristics, the magnitudes
of the biases also seem to follow a dose-response gradient just as they would
with a ‘true’ risk factor. I also find that my estimates of selection bias are not
particularly sensitive to my definition of seatbelt law.
However, I am left with something of a puzzle regarding the interaction
terms between seatbelt use and seatbelt laws. I find evidence of increased selec-
tion for diabetes, but none of the other diseases. A possible explanation lies in
the health literature. Of the diseases examined above, behavior plays the great-
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Table 3.5: ‘Effect’ of Seatbelt Use on Coronary Heart Disease
Law: Primary Enforcement
Model (1) (2) (3)
Wears Seatbelt:
Almost Always 0.0064*** 0.0066*** 0.0065***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Sometimes 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 0.0070***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Seldom 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 0.0156***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Never 0.0160*** 0.0162*** 0.0162***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Interaction Terms:
Alm. Always * Post 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Sometimes * Post -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0012
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Seldom * Post 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Never * Post 0.0008 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045)
State Linear Trends ! !
State Quadratic Trends !
Number of Observations: 1,175,408
Number of Clusters: 51
Models specified as in Section 3.3. ** and *** represent sig-
-nificance at the 5% and 1% level.
est role by far in diabetes. Ripsin, Kang and Urban (2009) show that lifestyle
measures may reduce the risk of type 2 diabetes by over 50%. On the other hand,
Tang et. al (1998) find that dietary intervention trials only reduced cholesterol
by an average of 5%. A large, famous historical lifestyle modification experi-
ment (the MR-FIT trial) was also able to reduce cholesterol by 5%, but had no
significant effect on deaths from cardiovascular disease (Multiple Risk Factor
Intervention Trial Research Group, 1982). If both chronic diseases and tastes for
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Table 3.6: ‘Effect’ of Seatbelt Use on Heart Attack
Law: Primary Enforcement
Model (1) (2) (3)
Wears Seatbelt:
Almost Always 0.0051*** 0.0053*** 0.0053***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Sometimes 0.0122*** 0.0123*** 0.0124***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Seldom 0.0206*** 0.0207*** 0.0208***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Never 0.0311*** 0.0312*** 0.0313***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Interaction Terms:
Alm. Always * Post 0.0021 0.0018 0.0017
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Sometimes * Post 0.0012 0.0009 0.0008
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Seldom * Post -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0029
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Never * Post 0.0023 0.0021 0.0019
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
State Linear Trends ! !
State Quadratic Trends !
Number of Observations: 1,180,591
Number of Clusters: 51
Models specified as in Section 3.3. ** and *** represent sig-
-nificance at the 5% and 1% level.
health are highly heritable, we should see evidence of a relationship between
tastes for health and chronic disease – but changing tastes (i.e. selecting into a
more frequent seatbelt use group) will not change the individual’s risks. It may
thus increase the average risk of the group selected into, and thus decrease the
difference between that group and the group selected out of.
It is also entirely plausible that seatbelt laws and health advice are incen-
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Table 3.7: ‘Effect’ of Seatbelt Use on Stroke
Law: Primary Enforcement
Model (1) (2) (3)
Wears Seatbelt:
Almost Always 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Sometimes 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Seldom 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0067***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Never 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0119***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Interaction Terms:
Alm. Always * Post -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0015
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Sometimes * Post 0.0053** 0.0052** 0.0051**
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Seldom * Post -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0043
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Never * Post 0.0067 0.0066 0.0065
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
State Linear Trends ! !
State Quadratic Trends !
Number of Observations: 1,183,134
Number of Clusters: 51
Models specified as in Section 3.3. ** and *** represent sig-
-nificance at the 5% and 1% level.
tives that affect different groups of people, and those who begin wearing their
seatbelt in response to a law do so because of the possible financial and legal
penalties, not because they have acquired any new information about the dan-
gerousness of driving without a seatbelt. If this is the case, those left behind in
the non–seatbelt-wearing group will not be those who most enjoy not wearing
their seatbelts, but those who most enjoy not wearing their seatbelts and who
can afford to pay the penalties for doing so. Unfortunately, I know of no good
125
dataset to study the effect of irrelevant health advice. Seatbelt laws must serve
as an imperfect proxy.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I demonstrate that, even after controlling for observable con-
founders, seatbelt use is highly correlated with the risks of several chronic dis-
eases. Furthermore, I have shown that the magnitudes of the relative risks seem
to follow a dose-response gradient, and some of them are as great as 50%. This
should be taken as a call for caution in observational epidemiological studies:
even ‘risk factors’ which appear to be highly statistically significant with large-
seeming effect sizes can be driven entirely by selection bias.
I have found some evidence that an event (in my case, the passage of a seat-
belt law) may change the way individuals select into categories of the treatment
variable. In my case, I was able to observe the passage of laws; in general, a
researcher may not know what kinds of information, regulation or passing fad
may alter the relationship between the treatment variable and unobserved con-
founders. In this case, only randomization (by design or by natural experiment)
will be adequate to resolve the bias.
In light of these problems with observational studies, epidemiologists and
others studying chronic disease should be encouraged to make use of quasi-
experimental techniques; these are not unheard of in the health literature (e.g.
Stukel et. al, 2007) but their use must become commonplace if causal inferences
made from observational data are to be trusted. There is great need for more
evidence from randomized controlled trials in chronic disease epidemiology, as
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the ratio of non–quasi-experimental observational studies to experimental trials
is quite high – and this runs the risk of generating many false health recommen-
dations. Even if the health cost of an irrelevant recommendation is minimal, the
welfare loss to the individual who gives up something they enjoy to chase false
health benefits may be great.
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Table A.1: Spending Components of Fixed Cost
Fixed Cost Assumption
Spending Category Low Medium High
Current Expenditure - Instruction
Current Expenditure - Support Services
Pupil Support !
Instructional Staff Support !
General Administration ! !
School Administration ! !
Operation and Maintenance of Plant ! ! !
Student Transportation ! ! !
Business/Central/Other ! !
Nonspecified
Food Services
Enterprise Operations
Other Elementary/Secondary
Current Expenditures - Non Elementary/Secondary
Community Services ! !
Adult Education
Other
Capital Outlay
Construction
Land and Existing Structures
Instructional Equipment
Other Equipment
Nonspecified Equipment
Other Expenditures
Payments to State Governments ! ! !
Payments to Local Governments ! ! !
Payments to Other School Systems ! ! !
Payments to Private Schools ! ! !
Interest on Debt ! ! !
Salaries
Instruction
Pupil Support
Instructional Staff Support
General Administration ! !
School Administration ! !
Operation and Maintenance of Plant ! !
Student Transportation ! ! !
Business/Central/Other ! !
Food Service
Employee Benefits
Instruction !
Pupil Support !
Instructional Staff Support !
General Administration ! !
School Administration ! !
Operation and Maintenance of Plant ! !
Student Transportation ! ! !
Business/Central/Other ! !
Food Services !
Enterprise Operations !
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Table A.5: First Stage Models
Model WTP and Local Revenue
Medium
Variable Charter Charter×WTP Charter×Local
Urban Policy 0.058** -0.157 0.013**
(0.025) (0.116) (0.007)
Academic Emergency Policy 0.006 -0.066 0
(0.017) (0.135) (0.0004)
Academic Watch Policy 0.042*** -0.082 0.001
(0.013) (0.051) (0.003)
Urban×WTP -0.011*** 0.098*** -0.003**
(0.003) (0.024) (0.001)
AE×WTP -0.003* 0.056** 0
(0.002) (0.023) (0.001)
AW×WTP -0.007** 0.102*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.017) (0.001)
Urban×Local -0.100** 0.390* -0.019
(0.043) (0.210) (0.012)
AE×Local 0.017 0.357 0.015
(0.042) (0.361) (0.012)
AW×Local -0.055** 0.312** 0.017**
(0.028) (0.155) (0.009)
F Statistic 15.68 18.09 7.70
Notes: N=11,585 district-year observations in 611 clusters. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table B.1: Non-UNCF Mellon Mays Institutions Participating by 2005
Institution First Year of Participation
Barnard College 1998
Bowdoin College 1993
Brown University 1994
Bryn Mawr College 1990
California Institute of Technology 1994
Carleton College 1989
Columbia University 1997
Cornell University 1990
CUNY Brooklyn College 1990
CUNY City College 1990
CUNY Hunter College 1990
CUNY Queens College 1990
Dartmouth College 1990
Duke University 1998
Emory University 2001
Harvard University 1990
Haverford College 2001
Macalester College 2001
Oberlin College 1989
Princeton University 1990
Rice University 1994
Smith College 2000
Stanford University 1989
Swarthmore College 1990
University of Chicago 1990
University of Pennsylvania 1990
University of Southern California 1994
Washington University in St. Louis 1994
Wellesley College 1990
Wesleyan University 1991
Williams Colelge 1990
Yale University 1990
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Table B.2: Mellon-Designated Fields
Fields as of 2000
Anthropology and Archaeology
Area/Cultural/Ethnic/Gender Studies
Art History
Classics
Demography, Geography and Population Studies
Earth/Environmental/Geological Science and Ecology
English
Ethnomusicology
Film, Cinema and Media Studies (theoretical focus)
Foreign Languages and Literatures
Linguistics
History
Literature
Mathematics
Musicology
Philosophy
Oceanographic/Marine/Atmospheric/Planetary Science
Physics and Astronomy
Political Theory
Religion and Theology
Theater (non-performance focus)
2008 Field Additions
Computer Science
Sociology
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Table B.3: Predictor Variables for Propensity Score Matches
Institution is Public
Fall Enrollment
Ratio of Undergraduates to All Students
Ratio of Female Undergraduate Students to All Undergraduate Stu-
dents
Ratio of Full-Time Undergraduate Students to All Undergraduate Stu-
dents
Ratio of Full-Time Female Faculty to All Female Faculty
Ratio of Female Faculty to All Faculty
Ratio of Full-Time Faculty to All Faculty
Ratio of Faculty to All Staff
Avg. 9–10 Month Salary for All Male Faculty
Avg. 9–10 Month Salary for All Female Faculty
Ratio of Undergraduate STEM Completions to All Undergraduate Com-
pletions
Ratio of Undergraduate Humanities Completions to All Undergraduate
Completions
Tuition and Fees per Student
Endowment Income per Student
Total Revenues per Student
Instruction Expenditure per Student
Academic Support Expenditure per Student
Student Services Expenditure per Student
Total Scholarship Expenditures per Student
Percentage of Student Body that is Black
Percentage of Student Body that is Asian
Percentage of Student Body that is Hispanic
140
Table B.4: Matched Control Institutions: Nearest Neighbor Match
Baptist Bible College of Pennsylvania
Carnegie Mellon University
Case Western Reserve University
Davidson College
Georgetown University
Goucher College
Le Moyne–Owen College
Long Island University
North Carolina State University at Raleigh
Northwestern University
Radcliffe College
Saint Basil’s College
San Diego State University
San Francisco Conservatory of Music
Seton Hall University
Smith College
Southern University Agricultural and Mechanical College
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Table B.5: Effect of MMUF Participation on the URM PhD Completion
Rate: Truncation Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) A&S 0.027 0.001 0.007 -0.001
(0.031) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005)
(b) A&S + Eng. -0.003 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
(c) All Fields -0.008 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Weights ! !
Simple Adjustment ! !
10-Year Adjustment ! !
Notes: OLS coefficients from twelve models are reported. For each
model, the dependent variable is the rate of PhD completion among
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institu-
tion in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of fields as
indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include the comparable rate for
white and Asian students, as well as year and institution fixed efects.
The simple adjustment is a truncation adjustment under the assump-
tion that the time to PhD pattern from 1985–1989 persists throughout
the sample. The 10-year adjustment is a truncation adjustment with a
quadratic model in time fit to the first 10 years of data. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively.
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Table B.6: Effect of MMUF Participation on the URM PhD Completion
Rate: Matched Comparison Group
(1) (2)
(a) A&S -0.009 -0.000
(0.006) (0.004)
(b) A&S + Eng. -0.013 -0.003
(0.007) (0.003)
(c) All Fields -0.014 -0.004
(0.007) (0.003)
1 Nearest Neighbor !
Kernel !
Notes: OLS coefficients from six models are reported. For each model,
the dependent variable is the predicted rate of PhD completion among
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institution
in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of fields as indi-
cated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation adjustment with a
quadratic model in time fit to the first 10 years of data. All models in-
clude the comparable rate for white and Asian students, as well as year
and institution fixed efects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
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Table B.7: Effect of Intensity of MMUF Participation on the URM PhD
Completion Rate
(1) (2)
(a) A&S -0.560 -0.253
(0.254) (0.099)
(b) A&S + Eng. -0.166 0.035
(0.092) (0.103)
(c) All Fields -0.250*** 0.127
(0.086) (0.173)
Unadjusted !
10-Year Adjustment !
Notes: Notes: OLS coefficients from sixs models are reported. For each
model, the dependent variable is the predicted rate of PhD completion
among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an in-
stitution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of fields
as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation adjustment with
a quadratic model in time fit to the first 10 years of data. All models in-
clude the comparable rate for white and Asian students, as well as year
and institution fixed efects. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates of the
effect of increasing the dosage of the program on PhD completion rates,
with Column (2) additionally adjusting for truncation. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by institution.
** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
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